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Abstract
The thesis is concerned with the evolution of prices in market economies.
In the first chapter we analyze price competition among firms with limited 
capacities in the framework of the classical Bertrand Edgeworth model. For this 
model it is well known that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist. We 
discuss the nature of this non-existence result. While enlarging the strategy space 
to include non-linear strategies in general does not suffice for existence in the 
simultaneous move game, the possibility of reactions to competitors* actions in a 
dynamic context may restore equilibrium.
In the remaining part of the thesis we analyze intermediation in frictional 
markets. When market participants are informed only imperfectly about potential 
trading opportunities, search and negotiations may prove costly. In such markets 
intermediaries by publicly quoting prices can help to reduce the transactional costs 
of exchange.
In chapter two we analyze the case, in which intermediaries have access to 
an information technology which informs the full market. We characterize 
equilibrium. The inability of market participants to coordinate market participation 
is reflected in a large variety of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Using a refinement 
criterion we find that high valuation traders typically trade with intermediaries, while 
low valuation traders engage in search. Moreover, price competition among several 
intermediaries yields Walrasian outcomes. Nevertheless, the market exhibits the 
features of a natural monopoly.
In chapter three we relax the assumption concerning the information 
technology. An intermediary's choice of an information network determines the size 
of his clientele and hence the probability of trading. In this case the size of the 
information network is viewed as a quality attribute by market participants and 
imperfect price competition among intermediaries obtains. We characterize the 
industrial structure of those markets as natural oligopolies. Consequently, there is 
no convergence to a fragmented industrial structure as the economy grows large. 
Still, as the largest competitors are of roughly equal size equilibrium allocations tend 
to be fairly competitive.
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Game Theoretic M odels o f Price Determ ination
and
Financial Intermediation
General Introduction
1. Introduction
This dissertation is concerned with the evolution of prices in market econo­
mies. Market economies are characterized by the free interaction of buyers and 
sellers of specific products or services.
It is frequently argued that market economies are adequately described by 
variants of the classical general equilibrium model as developed by Arrow and 
Debreu (Arrow, Hahn, 1971, Debreu, 1959). However, market equilibria of such 
economies do require a central price authority, commonly dubbed as the “in­
visible hand” or the “Walrasian auctioneer” . The auctioneer mediates between 
buyers and sellers in the various markets. He calculates equilibrium prices for all 
markets, informs the market participants about the vector of equilibrium prices 
and finally coordinates the exchange of products. All these “services” in the fic­
tion of the general equilibrium theory are provided costlessly. Therefore, in the 
Walrasian world it is difficult to incorporate intermediaries th a t specialize in 
trade. Ultimately intermediaries like the benevolent auctioneer have to provide 
their services for free.
While a theory of value for products and services can be based on the Wal­
rasian fiction in order to determine the relative scarcity of products, an explicit
8
analysis of the formation of prices requires a framework tha t explicitly relates 
those prices to actions taken by private agents of the market system.
Certainly, we observe a wide variety of mechanisms of price determination. 
In some markets trade may occur directly between buyers and sellers and prices 
are determined in bilateral bargaining. In other markets sellers unilaterally quote 
fixed prices as take-it-or-leave-it offers which the buyer may accept or not. Fur­
thermore there are markets which are organized by specialized private interme­
diaries as the Stock Exchange, the Metal Exchange or the auction houses.
The thesis focuses on models in which private agents and in particular private 
intermediaries contribute to the organization of markets and to the determination 
of prices. In the following section we explain in more detail the informational 
properties of the Walrasian model. Section 3 discusses our contribution to price 
competition as presented in chapter 1, while section 4 gives a brief account of 
our analysis of intermediation in frictional markets.
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2. General Equilibrium and the Invisible Hand
Before we discuss the informational suspects of the general equilibrium theory 
we shall give a short account of the equilibrium model.
Equilibrium theory distinguishes two types of agents, consumers and produc­
ers. Consumers are characterized by their preferences for the various products 
and services (precisely: commodities) and their initial endowments of products 
including factors of production. Producers are endowed with technologies, which 
summarize the technological knowledge necessary for the transformation of pro­
duction factors into intermediate and final products. In deciding about the quan­
tity of factors offered and the quantity of products demanded, consumers are 
restrained by the value of their initial resources, which restricts their budget. 
It is assumed th a t the consumers’ choices maximize their utilities for any given 
price system. Likewise producers maximize profits, defined as the difference be­
tween value of the sales and factor costs for a given price system. The economy 
is said to be in equilibrium, when aggregate demand and aggregate supply are 
equal for each commodity. Thus, in an equilibrium at the given equilibrium price 
system consumers and producers will not regret their trades and each of them 
can realize his plans. If traders therefore are advised to trade at Walrasian prices 
and if they are told with whom to exchange which quantity, clearly the resulting 
allocation is stable in the sense that no further improvement through bilateral 
trade should be possible.
The general equilibrium theory is a theory of value. As such it addresses the 
question of the “correct price” of the various products or commodities in terms 
of their relative scarcity value in the economy. In an equilibrium agents planning 
on the basis of those “scarcity prices” will never regret their actions. This entails 
a remarkable informational efficiency of the market system, emphasized particu­
larly by Friedrich August v.Hayek (1945). Individuals do not need to know the 
details of sudden and frequently offsetting increases and decreases in supply or 
demand of specific goods. The scarcity prices summarize all information relevant 
for individual consumption or investment decisions. Thus, the price system serves
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as a unique communication device economizing on the transmission of informa­
tion, sending the essential signals only and coordinating independent individual 
actions.
This coordination property is summarized in Hayek’s own words: “The whole 
acts as one market, not because any of its members survey the whole field, but 
because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through 
many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all. The mere 
fact that there is one price for any commodity - or rather that local prices are 
connected in a manner determined by the cost of transportation, etc.- brings about 
the solution which (it is ju st conceptually possible) might have been arrived at by 
one single mind possessing all the information which is in fact dispersed among 
all the people involved in the process.” (1945, p.526)
Hayek’s argument strongly rests on the “Law of One Price” . Given scarcity 
prices are uniquely defined in a particular equilibrium, there is no doubt about 
their interpretation in terms of the general scarcity of products. Thus, those 
scarcity prices can guide individuals’ actions to the general benefit. However, 
Hayek does not give an account of the actual formation of market or transac­
tion prices. His reference to local prices suggests th a t implicitly any arbitrage 
possibilities are exploited and actual transaction prices therefore coincide with 
scarcity prices.
This to some extent contradicts an earlier statem ent of Hayek in the same ar­
ticle in which he explicitly discusses the distinction between technological knowl­
edge and knowledge about trading opportunities. In his words, “...the estate agent 
whose whole knowledge is almost exclusively one of temporary opportunities, or 
the arbitrageur who gains from local differences in commodity prices, are all per­
forming eminently useful functions based on special knowledge of circumstances 
of the fleeting moment not known to others” (Hayek, 1945, p.522). This amounts 
to saying tha t not all individuals at any point in time enjoy the same informa­
tion about market prices and hence trading opportunities. Rather private agents 
are constantly searching for arbitrage opportunities and markets are constantly 
adapting to new conditions. Markets operate dynamically. Informing the “mar­
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ket” , therefore, is an “eminently useful” allocative function. It is useful because it 
helps to adjust scarcity prices to their “true” values. On the other hand because 
of the dispersion of knowledge it implies that at any point in time virtually the 
same physical product at the same location may be traded at different terms 
between different trading partners.
At this point the question arises what constitutes a market. According to the 
definition of commodities in the general equilibrium framework the market for a 
single commodity is defined by the physical quality and the location, time and 
state of nature of its availability. In such a framework the informational efficiency 
emphasized by Hayek is quite a strong property. If in addition markets should be 
differentiated with respect to information that different agents might have at cer­
tain points in time and space, including information about trading possibilities, 
the commodities traded would have to be defined in an exceedingly narrow way. 
It would be difficult to reconcile the conventional notion of (competitive) markets 
with such a concept of markets in personalized claims. Certainly, Hayek’s view of 
markets abstracts from informational differences among the various participants.
Based on the strong belief tha t prices will adjust to their “true” scarcity val­
ues, i.e. their equilibrium values in the language of the theory, general equilibrium 
theory concentrates on a static market framework. Market prices adjust rapidly 
enough such th a t individual traders do not incur transaction costs. Therefore, 
differential knowledge about trading opportunities is not considered an impor­
tan t problem and hence remains unmodelled. The Walrasian auctioneer costlessly 
provides two im portant economic roles. First, based on the knowledge of the ex­
cess demand functions he can calculate equilibrium prices. Those are the scarcity 
prices of the various commodities. Note that he does not need to know the indi­
vidual demand and supply functions; it suffices to know the aggregate quantity. 
Furthermore the auctioneer has to inform all market participants about the equi­
librium prices, because otherwise they cannot condition their behaviour on the 
correct scarcity signals. Second, once he has determined market clearing prices, 
the exchange of products has to be coordinated.
The public good character of the auctioneer’s price setting function is high­
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lighted in the information paradox discussed in a series of papers by Grossman 
and Stiglitz 1 . If traders are asymmetrically informed about the returns of a secu­
rity, uninformed traders may infer information from market clearing prices. High 
share prices for example may reflect insiders’ expectation of high future dividend 
payments. Under the rational expectations hypothesis uninformed traders by con­
ditioning their behaviour on equilibrium prices can acquire information about the 
underlying asset. A rational expectations equilibrium may fail to exist. If it ex­
ists, however, depending on the source of uncertainty, it may reveal completely 
the relevant information to the badly informed traders. In this case equilibrium 
prices are fully revealing and informed traders cannot benefit from superior in­
formation. Hence, they have no incentive to acquire the relevant information. If, 
however, no information is collected the question arises, how this information 
should be embodied in prices at all. This paradox essentially stems from the auc­
tioneer’s role in establishing prices, which allows uninformed traders to deduce 
information costlessly and therefore precludes well informed traders from taking 
advantage of superior information. Accordingly, Grossman and Stiglitz conclude 
that informational efficient markets are impossible.
While general equilibrium focuses on the analysis of scarcity prices the fiction 
of the Walrasian auctioneer may serve as a good approximation to value theory. 
If the interest however lies in the discussion of the micro structure of markets 
and the evolution of prices, clearly, this paradigm cannot be accepted. There 
are several ways of how one might visualize the emergence of prices in an econ­
omy without Walrasian auctioneer. Hayek himself seems to suggest th a t price 
competition between sellers for example might generate outcomes compatible 
with Walrasian outcomes. Alternatively one might explicitly model “frictional” 
markets in which knowledge about trading opportunities remains incomplete. 2 .
1 see Grossman, Stiglitz (1980) for example
2 Since we are interested in the role of “real world auctioneers” we do not 
discuss “remedies” to the information paradox, which build on auctioneer based 
models. Such strategies have been pursued by Grossman, Stiglitz (1980) and 
Hellwig (1980) for example
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After the first suggestion is taken up in chapter one the following chapters 
two and three concentrate on modelling frictional markets. The analysis in the 
thesis is restricted to a partial market framework, concentrating on the “market” 
for a single commodity and sidestepping the interaction among “markets” for 
different commodities.
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3. Price Com petition and Coordination Failures
Chapter one starts with an analysis of price competition. Price competition 
is an important element of the strategic interaction among intermediaries. After 
all, one of the main justifications of intermediation is the provision of an attractive 
price system. It is well known that price competition among firms with constant 
marginal costs implements the Walrasian outcome whenever at least two firms are 
active. This result, however, requires tha t competitors’ capacities are unlimited. 
With limited capacities actually a Nash equilibrium in prices may fail to exist. 
The non- existence results from a coordination problem of the competitors in 
allocating quantities.
This can be illustrated by means of a simple example. Consider a single 
buyer willing to purchase 3 units of a perishable product at a reservation price of 
1 and two firms each disposing of 2 units of that commodity. Competition works 
as follows. The firms simultaneously and independently offer a price per unit. 
Having observed these offers the buyer decides how many units to purchase from 
each seller. There is no further trading opportunity in time. Due to excess supply 
the Walrasian equilibrium price is zero, however, the game does not possess a 
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason is simple. Each competitor enjoys 
some residual market power, since given his competitor offers zero prices he can 
sell 1 unit at the monopoly price of 1. Therefore, each of the rivals has an incentive 
to withhold products at the Walrasian price in order to exert his market power 
on the remaining unit. On the other side if both rivals demand the monopoly 
price, one of them will not be able to sell both units. Hence, he has an incentive to 
slightly lower his prices and undercut his competitor. Actually, undercutting will 
be profitable for one of the rivals for any positive price. Therefore, an equilibrium 
in pure strategies does not exist.
To be sure the example is quite special. In particular, if each unit is offered by 
a different firm equilibrium exists and coincides with the Walrasian equilibrium. 
On the other hand in the framework of partial equilibrium with perfectly divisible 
products and increasing marginal costs the non-existence result obtains for any
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finite number of firms. Thus, the non-existence problem also obtains for large 
numbers. Price competition lacks the coordinating properties of the Walrasian 
auctioneer.
Chapter one discusses the robustness of price competition. In particular, 
the question is posed whether the non-existence phenomenon might result from 
artificial restrictions of the strategy space.
The motivation for this approach can be illustrated by the given example. 
Suppose the two firms could commit to sell their products in bundles of 2 units. 
In this case there is a unique Nash equilibrium in prices with each competitor de­
manding the price 1 for the whole bundle. Thus, the implied per unit equilibrium 
price is 1/2, but it cannot be implemented, if the price offers are restricted to 
per unit prices as seen before. Equilibrium in pure strategies however is possible, 
when non-linear price schedules are allowed. If the competitors are allowed to 
offer prices with discounts, in equilibrium they could offer the following schedule. 
For the first unit they demand the price 1 and all further units are free. This 
suggests that it might be possible to avoid the non-existence problem by enlarg­
ing the strategy set. We shall however find that this intuition is correct only in 
the case of a single buyer.
The central result of chapter one demonstrates the generality of the non­
existence problem. It identifies the failure of coordination in quantities as the 
main source driving the non-existence result in the context of static competi­
tion. It is shown tha t elements of sequential competition do allow for sufficient 
coordination as to restore equilibrium. Nevertheless, existence does not imply 
uniqueness and typically a wide range of equilibrium outcomes leaves additional 
reason for coordination. In this sense Walrasian equilibria imply a higher de­
gree of coordination than equilibria in games of price competition among private 
agents. Price competition and Walrasian competition are different equilibrium 
concepts. 3
The existence problem for an equilibrium in prices also arises in a differ­
3 Yanelle (1988) makes a similar point for price competition among interme­
diaries
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ent context. If for example customers are only incompletely informed about the 
prices on offer, typically there will be customers relatively well informed about 
competitors’ prices and others who may not be aware of any other price. In such 
cases intermediaries have an incentive to quote high prices to capture rents from 
the badly informed clients and competitive prices for well informed clients. If 
it is impossible to discriminate between differentially informed clients a similar 
coordination problem arises in the price game among intermediaries. It is for­
mally equivalent to the existence problem in case of strictly limited capacities. 
We shall be concerned with this issue again in chapter 3 in an environment, 
in which intermediaries can inform their clients about their price quotes only 
incompletely.
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4. Interm ediation and Frictional Markets
Chapters two and three analyze frictional markets in which knowledge about 
trading opportunities is dispersed and incomplete. Hence, we are taking up the 
theme of the second of Hayek’s quotes. In such markets a natural role arises for 
intermediaries to reduce the impacts of the informational frictions.
In the absence of intermediaries market participants have to search for trad­
ing partners themselves. This may be time consuming and therefore costly. In­
termediaries could help to speed up exchange and even if they charge a fee for 
their services it might be preferable for traders with an urgent desire for trade 
to transact via the intermediary rather than search for trading partners.
We think of an intermediary as an institution who informs the market about 
trading opportunities. He may achieve this by actively advertising widely buying 
(bid) and selling (ask) prices for certain commodities. Thus, market participants 
will become aware of the intermediary’s identity and the prices at which he is 
willing to trade, which typically are based partially on the intermediary’s views 
about the fundamental scarcity value and on strategic considerations otherwise. 
The intermediary’s activity offers market participants the possibility to avoid 
time consuming search for trading partners and to trade directly with him.
In analyzing intermediaries we assume tha t as any other market participant 
they do know the distribution of reservation prices and therefore aggregate de­
mand and supply. However, they do not possess any informational advantage 
about specific trading opportunities. It is their presence in the market and their 
information generating activity which allows them  to a ttract and match cus­
tomers. We assume that they have access to an information technology, which 
allows them to communicate their price quotes to a fraction of the market. They 
are prepared to transact with potential customers at the prices offered. Typically, 
bid and ask prices differ by a positive amount commonly termed the spread. How­
ever, price commitments are limited by the intermediaries’ ability to find m atch­
ing trading partners. If they do not succeed the trading opportunity is lost and
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we assume no further penalty is imposed on the intermediaries. In other words 
bankruptcy cannot occur. Nevertheless, intermediaries have a natural incentive 
to quote prices tha t allow to transact positive volumes, since they earn revenue 
in form of the spread for each transaction.
Thus, in purchasing the technology intermediaries generate a degree of vis­
ibility in the market. Intermediaries informing a large fraction of the market 
are highly visible, whereas others may be hardly discernible from individual 
searchers. Because of their visibility in the market they can help to speed up 
the process of exchange and charge positive spreads.
Market participants facing a list of price quotes and the option of search 
choose according to the relative attractiveness of the various possibilities. Indirect 
trade may present the problem that the intermediary himself is not able to fulfil 
his commitment since he does not find a trading partner on the other market 
side. In this case costs of delay occur. Furthermore, even if the intermediary 
should be able to trade his price quote might be quite unattractive relative to 
the alternatives. Consequently, the tradeoff between the gains from trade and the 
probability of trading determines market participants’ choices.
Now, intermediaries in setting prices not only compete against each other 
but also against the search market. Thus, we can distinguish between traders 
who prefer intermediated trade and traders who are active on the search market. 
Accordingly, we can interpret the set of traders on the intermediated market 
as constituting the organized market. Price competition among intermediaries 
is not restricted to the organized market but has to take account also of the 
unorganized “shadow” market.
It is convenient to separate the analysis into two steps. In chapter two we 
discuss the case, in which intermediaries either inform the full market or are not 
active at all, while in chapter three intermediaries can choose to which extent 
they plan to inform the market.
The results of chapter two can be classified according to the number of 
active intermediaries in the market. The outcomes in case of a single intermediary 
substantially differ from the case of several active intermediaries.
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If one monopolist intermediary is active the competition between the or­
ganized and the unorganized market becomes particularly transparent. In equi­
librium the monopolist charges a positive spread. The spread decreases with 
an increasing matching probability and hence efficiency of the search market. 
Traders with large gains from trade prefer to deal with the monopolist whereas 
traders with low gains engage in search. Hence, in equilibrium both the organized 
and the search market are active.
In addition, however, a wide multiplicity of subgame perfect Nash equilib­
ria illustrates the coordination problems inherent in models of intermediation. 
For example, there is a sequential equilibrium, in which no trade through the 
intermediary occurs. If no single trader deals with the intermediary and this is 
common knowledge, no single trader will waste his time and supply an application 
to the monopolist, because he knows that the monopolist will not be able to find 
a matching trade. We shall argue, however, tha t in some sense the equilibrium 
singled out above is more appealing.
In the case of competing intermediaries the classical Bertrand result obtains 
and equilibrium bid and ask prices coincide with the (unique) Walrasian equilib­
rium prices. Intermediaries’ spreads and revenues are zero in equilibrium. Again 
for the same coordination problems as above a wide variety of subgame perfect 
Nash equilibria exists. Nevertheless, it may be argued that the zero profit equi­
librium is more plausible for the model under consideration and in this sense 
we have found a rationalization for the view that price competition will entail 
Walrasian outcomes.
However this result rests on strong assumptions. So far, costs have been 
totally neglected. Once costs for setting up an information technology have to be 
incurred this result will no longer hold. Suppose sunk costs have to be incurred 
for the purchase of the information technology prior to the competition stage. 
For example intermediaries may have to set up a communications network or 
some advertising agent. In this case in equilibrium at most one intermediary will 
enter the intermediation sector, because only as a monopolist he can earn positive 
revenue and therefore recoup his outlays. Even more, the monopoly result arises
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for any positive level of sunk costs.
On the other side, as argued before, in equilibrium the monopolist inter­
mediary cannot demand prices at will. He is constrained by competition of the 
search market. In equilibrium he charges positive spreads which constitute trans­
action costs of exchange for the ultimate traders. In this sense we have given 
an endogenous explanation of transaction costs based on trading frictions in the 
search market and the nature of competition among intermediaries. At this point 
we should also note tha t trade typically occurs at different prices in the search 
market. Trivially, on the organized market there is a single equilibrium price.
In chapter 3 we allow intermediaries to establish their own information net­
work. By constructing a large network intermediaries can inform a large portion 
of the market. Furthermore, by setting up different networks they can avoid di­
rect contact with rivals or reduce the impact of price competition. The choice 
of an information network allows them to differentiate themselves from competi­
tors and relax price competition accordingly. Therefore, one might expect several 
intermediaries to be active in equilibrium.
However, care has to be taken in formulating the model. Especially, if all 
trading opportunities happen to occur simultaneously and intermediaries can­
not target their information signals, existence of a price equilibrium in pure 
strategies cannot be ascertained. Butters (1977), for example, demonstrates the 
non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in prices, when firms advertise their 
prices. This is due to the conflict between exploiting market power against badly 
informed customers and competing for market shares among the relatively well 
informed clients mentioned at the end of section 3. If the price quotes could be 
targeted discriminatory pricing would guarantee existence of price equilibrium 
again and this Bertrand Edgeworth type of problem would not occur.
We choose to model a brokerage market in an “island economy” . Market 
participants are scattered on various islands and their desire for trade is gener­
ated by unforeseen liquidity events which for example urge them to sell a large 
bundle of stock. Typically, several brokers are active on each island and traders 
select one of them to search for a suitable trading partner. Brokers maintain
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their presence on various islands connecting the subsidiaries by an information 
network, which allows them  to communicate with potential trading partners in 
the network. The chosen scale of information activity affects the intermediaries’ 
probabilities of finding matching partners for a given client. Intermediaries with 
larger investments are more likely to satisfy their customers. Therefore, an inter­
mediary’s size, as measured by the size of his information network, is viewed as a 
quality attribute. In other words, traders facing the same price quotes from two 
intermediaries with different size might prefer to transact with the larger inter­
mediary simply for the reason of a higher probability of trade. Thus, imperfect 
price competition in the model of chapter 3 corresponds to price competition 
with vertically differentiated products (Shaked, Sutton, 1982).
Industries in which products are vertically differentiated may exert an in­
nate tendency towards concentrated industrial structures. The notion of a con­
centrated industrial structure is described by the concept of *natural oligopoly” 
developed by Shaked and Sutton (1983). According to their definition an indus­
try is a natural oligopoly, when the number of firms active in this industry is 
bounded independently of the size of the economy. In particular such an indus­
try  does not converge to a fragmented and competitive industrial structure as 
the economy grows large but remains concentrated.
By arguments similar to those of Shaked and Sutton (1982) we can establish 
a bound for the number of intermediaries active in equilibrium. In particular 
we find that the natural industrial structure of our brokerage market consists of 
three “large” intermediaries and a competitive fringe of “smaller” competitors. 
This finding contrasts with the monopoly result of chapter two. Nevertheless, the 
industrial structure is fairly concentrated.
In such an equilibrium intermediaries select different information networks 
in order to relax price competition. Hence, they also quote different prices. In 
our model with linear demand and supply the large intermediaries enjoying a 
relatively high degree of visibility can command larger spreads while maintaining 
larger market shares at the same time. Typically, all intermediaries earn positive 
profits.
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Consequently, even the organized markets exhibit price dispersion. Transac­
tion prices do not coincide with scarcity prices. However, there is a well-defined 
relation between them. In a symmetric equilibrium the scarcity price simply is 
the mean of the bid and the ask price. Furthermore, it is identical for all interme­
diaries. Therefore, the results of chapters two and three should not be taken as 
contradicting classical general equilibrium theory. Rather, they suggest to distin­
guish between transaction prices and scarcity values. The model outlined suggests 
a tool for explaining the evolution of market prices and market institutions. The 
thrust of the argument is tha t these institutions arise endogenously in pursuit of 
private gains by exploiting trading frictions in the market.
Our model combines two different strands of literature. Stahl (1988) and 
Yanelle (1988) analyze pure price competition among intermediaries. While Stahl 
considers a fixed market structure tha t forces buyers and sellers to transact indi­
rectly through the intermediaries, Yanelle also allows for a choice between direct 
and indirect trade. In her model intermediaries enjoy technological economies of 
scale. However, they are not explained in terms of market generating activities.
The second connection exists to “middlemen” of Rubinstein and Wolinsky 
(1985a). They explicitly take into account trading frictions in a bargaining and 
matching framework based on Rubinstein, Wolinsky (1985b). There, the only 
advantage intermediaries enjoy is a higher frequency of encounters with trading 
partners. This is imposed exogenously and not derived from the intermediaries’ 
activities. Since in their model trading opportunities are exclusively determined 
by the matching technology traders do not have an active choice between sev­
eral modes of transaction. Thus, their only choice is between trading with the 
present matching partner or delaying trade, while it is not ascertained th a t in­
dividual traders might ever get a chance to trade with an intermediary. Trading 
opportunities are exogenously given. Accordingly, in Rubinstein’s and Wolinsky’s 
framework intermediaries cannot affect their matching probabilities by increasing 
their relative attraction to market participants. In our model, by investing in vis­
ibility, intermediaries contribute to mediating between potential trading partners 
and create additional trading opportunities.
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In combining these two approaches price setting intermediaries arise endoge­
nously in a search environment. They contribute to the reduction of transaction 
costs. Therefore, the relation between equilibrium prices on organized and search 
markets and the industrial structure of the organized market can be analyzed in 
terms of the primitives of the model that are preferences, endowments and the 
matching technology.
By way of summarizing, the apparent contradiction between Hayek’s quotes 
does not arise in our model of chapters 2 and 3 and we may conclude in Hayek’s 
words: uFundamentally, in a system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is 
dispersed among many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions 
of different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to 
coordinate the parts of his plan” (Hayek, 1945, p .526).
24
Chapter 1
Bertrand Edgeworth Competition with Non-Linear Prices
1. Introduction
2. The Model
3. Monopsony
4. Several Buyers: Simultaneous Moves
5. Several Buyers: Sequential Moves
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Bertrand Edgeworth Com petition w ith Non- Linear Prices
1. Introduction
a) Motivation
The classical Bertrand game of price competition in homogeneous product 
markets is often viewed as providing a justification for the model of perfect com­
petition in the absence of a fictitious auctioneer (Allen, Hellwig, 1986). It has the 
appealing feature that prices are set by the agents who do so in reality. However 
it is well known that the existence of pure strategy equilibria is problematic as 
soon as capacity constraints are incorporated (Edgeworth, 1897).
These classical price games restrict the strategy space to constant per unit 
prices and therefore exclude the possibility of price discounts on large sales or 
other forms of non-linear pricing. The purpose of this chapter is to extend the 
analysis to the larger strategy space, which allows competitors to use non-linear 
price schedules. There are two reasons for doing so. First the non-existence result 
might be considered as an inconsistency of the price setting model per se. There­
fore it is im portant to understand the underlying forces behind this phenomenon. 
So it could be argued th a t non-existence results from an artificial restriction of 
the strategy space. In fact for a special case we shall demonstrate the validity of 
this line of reasoning (section 3).
The second motivation stems from considerations concerning the integra­
tion of contract theory into a more general framework. Abstracting from the 
design problems caused by asymmetric information and costly observation the 
strategic foundation of contract theory is the model of Bertrand competition in
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non-linear price schedules1 . Any price quantity contract can be viewed as some 
discontinuous function of prices in quantities. For this class of games in interde­
pendent markets competitive outcomes are well known to result whenever there 
are at least two competitors driving any excess profit down to zero in equilibrium. 
Therefore by imposing a zero profit condition this approach conveniently allows 
to separate the complexity of strategic interaction from the design problem and 
help to focus the analysis on the aspects of agency costs implied by the presence 
of informational asymmetries.
On the other hand by sidestepping the strategic analysis the approach delib­
erately remains partial. The occurrence of rationing on credit markets for example 
is among the most interesting results of the contract theoretical analysis. In line 
with the literature on fixed price equilibria (Dreze,1975) one would expect th a t in 
a more general treatm ent through a chain of spillovers the rationing phenomenon 
might feed back to the lenders or banks effectively constraining their capacity of 
granting loans. In such a setting the appropriate underlying strategic framework 
would seem to be a model of capacity constrained competition in contracts,.i.e. 
in non-linear price functions.
b) Overview: price setting oligopolies in homogeneous product markets
B ertrand’s original model of price competition (Bertrand, 1883) views firms 
as simultaneously quoting prices for a homogeneous product, which subsequently 
is produced at a constant marginal cost and distributed at the prices arranged. 
Since there are no constraints to production capacity any of the rivals potentially 
could serve the whole market. Therefore the competitors will profitably undercut 
each other until the marginal costs of the second most efficient firm and hence 
equilibrium is reached. If firms are identical the Walrasian equilibrium with prices 
equalling marginal costs will obtain.
As capacity constraints are introduced however rival firms might actually
1 see Hellwig (1988) for a methodological discussion of the contract theoretic 
approach.
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command equilibrium prices above marginal costs. Osborne and Pitchik (1986) 
demonstrate for a duopoly version of the above game the existence of unique 
pure strategy equilibria for the case tha t either capacities are severely restricted 
or for the case, in which they are sufficiently available. When aggregate capacity 
is severely constrained relative to demand in a sense to be made precise below, 
undercutting will become unprofitable at the price at which demand just exhausts 
total production and equilibria with positive price cost margins emerge. If on the 
other side the capacity of any individual firm is not strictly necessary, competition 
will drive margins down to zero and the efficient competitive outcome will result. 
It is the intermediate region of capacities, in which there does not exist a pure 
strategy equilibrium if only linear prices are admitted. This point was made 
already by Edgeworth (1897) and leads us to study a more general strategy 
space to include non-linear prices.
Consequently we have to model the buyers as discrete players rather than a 
continuum of negligibly small traders. In the extreme case of only one single buyer 
we find that there will be a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with non­
linear price functions in equilibrium. This finding does not generalize to the case 
of several buyers. Rather we do find tha t the Edgeworth non-existence problem 
generalizes even to the strategy space, which does allow sellers to simultaneously 
offer price functions. More precisely we develop the concept of an essential seller 
as a capacity constrained seller, who is strictly needed for any efficient allocation. 
We then show that non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium occurs exactly, 
when there are at least two essential sellers. These sellers basically compete in 
selling off “excess capacities” thus “destabilizing” any equilibrium allocation.
There is a further a assumption implied in the standard Bertrand model of 
price competition: prices are set simultaneously. Therefore the model is static in 
character. With a more general strategy space it turns out that mechanisms of 
sequential competition in contracts may allow for enough quantity commitment 
to allow the existence of pure strategy equilibria. We illustrate this by means 
of a game form in which competition takes place in two stages. At stage one 
the competitors choose maximal quantities for each customer and at stage two,
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having observed all their rivals quantity allocation they decide about prices. For 
this game the existence of a continuum of pure strategy equilibria is established. 
So the “dynamic” model proposed here will have pure strategy equilibria. How­
ever, it will exhibit a similar indeterminateness to the one, which F.Y.Edgeworth 
(1897) might have had in mind, when interpreting such markets as inherently 
unstable and predicting “cyclical” price movements.
Interpreting these results we conclude tha t the non-existence problem is 
closely related to the implied rationing scheme. Note that in case of several buyers 
any equilibrium implies the use of some rationing scheme, i.e. an assignment of 
the buyers to the sellers. In the case of simultaneous price competition the conflict 
between the price game and the coordination on the rationing scheme cannot be 
solved in general.
Note also that in case of existence, generally the nature of equilibrium will 
be quite indeterminate. This suggests that the competitors still have to solve a 
coordination problem. Only in the case of just one buyer can we expect a unique 
equilibrium. This seems obvious, since in this case there will be no rationing 
problem.
In a way these results parallel those of Kreps, Scheinkman (1983) and David­
son, Deneckere (1986), who show the existence of pure strategy equilibria in a 
two stage game, in which firms on stage 1 choose capacities and at stage 2 prices. 
The equilibria in their models will typically depend on the underlying rationing 
scheme.
The chapter now proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model. 
In section 3 the case of a single buyer is discussed. In sections 4 and 5 the 
general cases with several buyers are discussed in game forms of simultaneous 
and sequential competition respectively.
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2. The M odel
We consider a model with finitely many players. There are B  buyers and S  
sellers. This allows us to model the notion of size, which we need to motivate 
the use of non-linear quantity dependent price schedules. The agents trade a 
homogeneous product which is available in a limited amount X 8 > 0 to any of the 
sellers s =  1,..., S  at constant marginal cost, which we normalize to zero up to the 
capacity limit. We interpret this product as an intermediate good, which is used 
by the buyers as a factor of production and which allows them to generate some 
profit or surplus nb(x) , 6 = 1 , . . . ,  B  as a function of the factor input x. In order to 
avoid complications arising from strategic interactions among the buyers on the 
final product market and to focus on the strategic interaction in the factor market 
we assume that the buyers’ profit functions are independent. In fact we shall also 
assume they are equal. The monotonicity assumption implies free disposal of any 
abundant factors. To avoid technical complications we shall assume without loss 
to the economic intuition the boundedness of the surplus function. W ithout the 
factors no production takes place and hence no surplus can be generated. The 
economically im portant condition is the concavity of the surplus function. We 
shall demonstrate tha t the case of a convex surplus function is less interesting. 
Therefore we state this assumption for the sake of clarity already here. Finally 
to avoid trivialities we assume that there are some real profit possibilities. By 
means of summarizing we have:
assum ption 1: (surplus)
a)7r : IR+ —► LR+
b)7r6(x) =  tt(x) , 6 = 1 ,  . . . ,B
c)limx^ 0^(®) =  0
d)7r(.) is bounded
e)7r(.) is non-decreasing
f)7r(.) is weakly concave
g)x* :=  inf argmax n(x) >  0
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The conditions of exchange of the products are determined in contracts.
Sellers do write these contracts c9b = (xeb,p 9b) specifying the quantity x 9b sold 
by seller s to buyer 6 at a total price of psb. We shall allow sellers to offer a 
whole menu of contracts C9b := [c,6 | c9b C iR+] E IR \  and let the buyers 
choose among them. These menus might be rather arbitrary and include non­
offered with the particular offer C9b =  [c,b : p9b =  const x ,b]. The only restriction 
to be imposed is th a t any contract can be written without recourse to some 
(convergent) series.
a ssu m p tio n  2: (contracts)
C9b is closed in ZR+ , 5 =  1,..., S  , 6 = 1 , . . . ,  B
The exact order of moves will vary in the subsequent sections. The general 
theme however is th a t contracts are offered by the sellers and that buyers sub­
sequently choose at a later stage. So the sellers’ strategies are menus, i.e. sets 
of contracts, from which the sellers choose at most one. The buyers’ strategies 
therefore can be defined as a vector db = (dib, ...,dat>), where d9b G C9b U (0,0) 
indicates, which contract is chosen from seller s. The zero element allows for re­
jection of the full menu. After contracts are signed the products are exchanged, 
production takes place and the players will receive their respective payoffs g9 and 
hb. Whereas the seller just earns the sum of the payments from all contracts sold, 
the payoffs for the buyer are calculated as total returns from the final product 
market less the factor costs stipulated by the contracts.
linear price schedules as functions of quantities. Also linear contracts could be
B B
^ ~^proj2d9b = ^  p9b , Vs
6 = 1 6 = 1
^ p r o f r d ,^ 2 p ro j\d ,
, V6
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where p ro j\(x ,y )  := x  and proj2(x ,y) :=  y
We shall also note tha t the payoffs are functions of the strategy choices of 
all players. In the sequel we prefer to suppress the arguments just for brevity of 
notation, as long as there is no risk of confusion. The proper notation should be:
hb =  hb{Ci,..., C s , d i ,..., <Ib ) 
where C9 : =  (C9l, ...,C9b)
All agents maximize their payoffs in a non-cooperative game, which excludes 
binding commitments to collusion. Since the sellers by offering the contracts move 
first, they can influence the outcome in all subsequent subgames and to that 
extent exert market power. Buyers on the other side react very passively and 
essentially solve an optimization problem.
We are interested in the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. 
As is known from Dasgupta, Maskin (1986) we might expect the existence of 
mixed strategy equilibria but in the context of the Bertrand Edgeworth game 
the interesting phenomenon is exactly the tension between market power and 
competition, which gives rise to the use of completely mixed strategies.
A A A A
A Nash equilibrium is defined as a strategy combination (C i, ,..,C S
where C9 : =  (C9 i 1 . . . ,  C8b), which for any player is the best reply to his opponents’
strategy choices, i.e.
A A A A A
C9 e  <ngmaxc g9(CL,... ,Cs idi , . . . ,d B ) 
db e  argmaxdb/il)(C'1, . . . ,C5 , d B)
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Subgame perfection requires that equilibrium choices of the players consti­
tu te  a Nash equilibrium in each subgame. The refinement excludes equilibria 
which are based on players’ expectations, which would not support a Nash equi­
librium in subsequent subgames. In these subgames players would have a natural 
incentive to deviate from their equilibrium strategy. In the absence of commit­
ment possibilities such equilibria seem unplausible.
Specifically, subgame perfection excludes Nash equilibria supported by non- 
credible threats. Threats are credible only if it is in the player’s own interest to 
enforce them once he is called to enact them.
So far we have completed the general description of the game.
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3. M onopsony
a) Equilibrium
We shall start with the case of a single buyer, i.e. B  = 1. This case is
particularly interesting, since there is no need to employ some rationing scheme. 
If the capacity of a single seller is exhausted it does not m atter which buyer he 
will serve. So the sellers offer the contracts at stage 1 and the monopsonist buyer 
decides about acceptance at stage 2:
stage 1: sellers offer menus of contracts Ctb € IR \  , s =  1 ,.. .,5
stage 2: buyer selects a set of contracts db =  (dlbi ...,d<6), 
where dtb €  C9h U {(0 ,0 )}
(0,0) := all offers (of seller s) rejected
For this game form we find Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In equilibrium 
each seller can earn his ‘marginal contribution’ to the monopolists’ surplus as 
stated in the following result:
Proposition 1
The generalized Bertrand Edgeworth game with a single buyer has subgame 
perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies, whichare payoff-unique:
Proof:
1. First note th a t under assumptions 1 and 2 the proposed equilibrium payoffs 
are well defined. As long as 7r(.) is concave hb > 0 . Therefore the buyer will 
participate actively in the game.
2. Since the sellers have the right of the first offer they obviously can guarantee 
the payoffs of at least gs by offering just the contract c8 =  (Xa,&,). This contract 
specifies the maximal price the buyer would be willing to pay for the additional 
quantity of factors, provided he receives the quantities X { from the competitors 
i ^  s.
3. On the other side, if all sellers offer to sell the quantities X, at price gt , i ^  s, 
the best price seller s can get is in fact gB as well, because this is exactly the 
price for which the buyer will be indifferent between acceptance and rejection.
4. If in any potential Nash equilibrium with c8 = (x9,p B) , x 8 =  X B , s =  1, ...,5  
the proof is already completed and we have shown tha t pB =  g8 in this case.
5. If however there is some seller s with x B < X 8, define a new game with 
capacities X, := X* , i ^  s and X 8 := x 8. Either the new game satisfies the 
conditions of step 3 above or there is another seller t with x t < X t . In the latter 
case redefine a new game with X t := x t . We can now continue this procedure 
until after finitely many steps all sellers satisfy the conditions of step 3.
W ithout loss of generality let us assume tha t seller s is already the last 
agent, for whom the iteration takes place. Then the new game will satisfy xt = 
Xi , i = 1 , . . . ,5  and (ca), defines an equilibrium for this game, since by means 
of restricting capacities only the strategy set of seller s is reduced. Therefore 
optimal responses will remain optimal for all other players.
Since x 8 by hypothesis is part of an equilibrium allocation we know from 
step 1 that the sellers can at least secure their marginal contributions, i.e. pB > 
gB , s =  1,..., S.
Furthermore for the constrained game we know from step 4.
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p. = r. = » (£ * .)  -  »(£*«
S=1 '
So we conclude g9 > g9 , 5 =  1, S
6. On the other side by construction:
»: =  * ( * .  +  X ^ )  -
'  i*» ' \;«£«
As 7r(x) is non-decreasing in x  we get:
Therefore in conclusion we have shown g9 =  g9 and consequently p9 = 
for all 5 =  1, ...,5
Q.E.D.
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b) Discussion
In equilibrium we find a theme well known to economists. Each seller receives 
his ‘marginal contribution’ to total surplus. Clearly, this contribution will be 
positive only as long as the factors are necessary to produce the maximal amount 
of surplus, in a sense made precise in the following corollary.
C o ro lla ry  1 (characterization of regimes)
a) When factors are ‘abundant \  i.e. if Vs : > x* then gf = 0 , s —
1 ,...,S  and hb = n(x*).
b) When factors are *scarce\ i.e. in the remaining cases, g9 > 0 and hb =  7r(x*). 
When factors are even lvery scarce \ i.e. ^29 X 9 < x* then x tb =  X B and gB > 0 .
Proof:
The corollary essentially rewrites proposition 1. Only for the case of very 
scarce resources we have to show th a t x 9b =  X 9 for any equilibrium contract 
(&9b,P»b)- Now imagine some seller s with x 9 b < X 9. So X), %*b < ^29X 9. Since 
7r is strictly increasing in the case considered seller 5 could profitably deviate 
from the proposed equilibrium strategy by offering x 9b =  X 9 at a price p9b +  e 
for some positive e, which is small enough to make the buyer accept the offer.
Q.E.D.
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Case a) can be considered the competitive case. Removal of any of the com­
petitors leaves enough capacity to still satisfy the optimal level of production. In 
this case none of the competitors is strictly necessary for production and hence 
the equilibrium payoff will not reward any of the sellers and the classical Bertrand 
result obtains. Clearly, if they could join efforts and collude, the competitive sit­
uation might change drastically. For example a grand coalition among all sellers 
would be able to claim all the surplus. However we have excluded this in the 
game form considered since we want to focus on the aspects of price competition 
among capacity constrained sellers.
In case b) any of the sellers is needed for the constrained optimal scale of 
production and therefore all of them are rewarded positive prices. In fact given 
all rival sellers claim their ‘marginal contribution’ for any of them, this also is 
the highest price they can achieve, because it leaves the monopsonist buyer just 
indifferent between acceptance and rejection. Any price lower than that would 
be welcome by the buyer. Figure 1 illustrates the various regimes.
The equilibrium payoff structure exhibits price dispersion although equilib­
rium is implemented in pure strategies. Sellers with larger capacities can claim 
larger parts of surplus in the case of scarce endowments of factors. Because of the 
concavity of the surplus function this is also true for the payoffs per capacity unit 
as corollary 2 demonstrates. Hence heterogeneity among the sellers causes price 
dispersion among the implied (per unit) equilibrium prices. As in the literature 
the observation of price dispersion in the real world is often taken as justifica­
tion for mixed strategy equilibria. The attraction here is tha t rational behaviour 
can also generate this phenomenon in pure strategies. Of course, the distribution 
of prices is determined by the distribution of factors among the sellers and the 
shape of the surplus function.
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C o ro lla ry  2 (price dispersion)
The equilibrium per unit prices 4**- are non-decreasing in x ,b. They are
x tb
strictly non-decreasing, when tt(.) is strictly concave.
Proof:
By virtue of the proof of proposition 1 (step 5) replacing absolute capacities 
X t by equilibrium quantities x 9b we can rewrite p9b as
P»b = j -  n\y2xib
\  = i '
The rest of the proof is accomplished by establishing the following lemma, 
which demonstrates a general property for (weakly) concave functions:
L em m a 1
Let f  : IR —► IR be a concave function and x > y > 0. Then for any A  the 
following property holds:
f ( A)  -  f ( A  -  x) > f ( A)  -  f ( A  -  y) 
x ~  y
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Proof:
Given that A — y = ^ (A  — x) + *-^-A  the conclusion follows directly from 
the concavity of / :
/(A  -  y) > ^  f ( A  -  x) +  ——-^ /(A )
X  X
This is equivalent to the statement of the lemma.
Q.E.D.
Now choose A = x ab , x = X 9 , y — x9 to prove the corollary.
Q.E.D.
Since the larger capacities enable sellers to demand higher per unit prices we 
can interpret the capacities as a measure of each seller’s market power. As long as 
factors are scarce, market power is limited and competition among the sellers is 
relaxed. As a seller’s capacity and hence his market power increases competition 
among the sellers intensifies, reducing their equilibrium profits and increasing the 
monopsonist’s payoffs. This is rigorously stated in the next corollary.
Corollary 3 (comparative static properties)
u e , < x* then an increase in the endowment of factors for seller s 
will strictly increase his equilibrium payoffs, while decreasing the returns for all 
competitors i ^  s. Also the buyer will benefit.
b) U  E, X > x* then an increase in the endowments of factors for seller s 
will not change the equilibrium payoff of seller s but it will decrease (weakly) the 
competitors1 payoff, while raising the monopsonisVs returns.
Proof: These properties follow immediately from corollary 1.
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An immediate consequence of corollary 3 is the convergence to a Walrasian 
equilibrium, whenever the capacities of at least two sellers are increased towards 
X * . Thus a uniform increase in the absolute level of market power will ulti­
mately implement the Walrasian equilibrium. This is a statement of the standard 
Bertrand justification for competitive outcomes.
However there is also a second theme more intrinsic to Walrasian theory. 
This views competitive outcomes as the limiting case of vanishing market power. 
Thus as the relative market power of the competitors shrinks to negligibility, 
competitive equilibria emerge in markets with a large number of rivals. This is 
stated in the following corollary.
C o ro lla ry  4 (Convergence to competition)
A A
Consider a sequence of economies ,..., X s )s  — «> such that m ax(X i,..., X s ) —► 
0 (S —*■ oo). I f  7r(.) is differentiable then for any subsequence sff it follows 
lim ^oo  =  p* , where p* is defined as the competitive per unit price: p* =
9 <7
J M E f - . * )
Proof:
The theorem establishes:
»•. =  * ( £ ) * • )  -  * ( e  x - )
'•=1 '  '
Hence by definition of differentiability
y 2- =  * • ) )  =
'  * = 1  '  ' - = 1  '
Q.E.D.
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As in Allen and Hellwig (1986) we find an oligopolistic foundation of per­
fect competition for the subcase, in which rationing of different buyers cannot 
occur. In fact we establish the result in pure strategies, whereas theirs is based 
on equilibrium distributions of mixed strategy equilibria for a given rationing 
scheme.
The results discussed so far strongly rely on the weak concavity of the surplus 
function 7r(.). In this case competition intensifies as the endowment constraints 
are relaxed because the marginal contribution of the factors to total surplus is 
decreasing. In the case of a convex surplus function however, the marginal con­
tribution of the factors is increasing, easing price competition among the sellers 
in a drastic way. In this case actually in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium the 
sellers will appropriate all the surplus and their only problem is to coordinate 
the split of profits among themselves.
P ro p o s it io n  2: (convex surplus)
In the case of a convex surplus function (replacing assumption I f  )  there is 
a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In equilibrium
x ,b = X , and ptb such that J2, P *b  =  X 9
Proof:
Obviously, for x, b < X , for some s, there will be a profitable deviation for 
s by offering a higher quantity of factors at a higher price. Therefore x gb = X„. 
Now given any set of equilibrium prices for the rivals pib , i /  s the optimal 
choice of a contractual price for seller s is
which leaves the buyer just indifferent between acceptance and rejection. So 
we have established csb = (x ,(,,/?,(,) as an equilibrium contract.
Q.E.D.
Finally the results also rely on the particular extensive form chosen. If the 
buyer had the right to offer the contracts and sellers were to respond, he could 
retain all the surplus generated from production. The interesting result of this 
section however is that even when all the bargaining power is given to the sellers, 
competition among them will reduce their claim to surplus, while enabling the 
buyer to earn a positive fraction as long as the surplus function is strictly concave. 
It is the strong position of the rivals in the market, which involves them in strong 
competition to the benefit of the buyer.
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c) Relation to the Classical Bertrand Edgeworth Game
The results discussed so far distinguish the model under study sharply from 
the classical Bertrand Edgeworth model with constant per unit prices. First we 
observe tha t the equilibrium contracts of proposition 1 are not generally linear 
contracts, which allow the buyer to purchase any quantity up to capacity at a 
constant per unit price. Therefore, the equilibrium allocation cannot generally be 
implemented with the classical strategy space used by Edgeworth CL := {(x, p) E 
IR \  | p =  const x}
C o ro lla ry  5 (non-linearity of equilibrium contracts)
The equilibrium of proposition 1 can be implemented by linear contracts c9h E 
C L if and only if p(x) =  const x or if total factors are abundant, i.e. if g9 > 0 .
Proof:
The result follows immediately from the concavity of 7r, which implies th a t 
the average contribution exceeds the contribution at the margin, which can be 
seen as a limiting case of lemma 1. If the buyer was allowed to purchase any 
quantity at a constant per unit price, he would prefer to purchase X  < x th, 
whenever factors are scarce and n(x)  is concave (see figure 2.)
Q.E.D.
Since it is known that Bertrand Edgeworth equilibria do exist, when re­
sources are sufficiently constrained (Osborne, Pitchik, 1986) and in fact are iden­
tical to the respective quantity constrained Cournot equilibria, we might ask how 
these equilibria compare to those identified here. As it turns out the Bertrand 
Edgeworth equilibria in linear prices in case of scarce factors do exist only as long 
as competition among the sellers is weak enough so that sellers in fact prefer to 
sell all their products despite of the adverse price effect. Therefore the equilib­
rium  price for the classical Bertrand Edgeworth game is given by the slope of
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the surplus function at the margin, which is the same for all sellers. Since for 
strictly concave surplus functions this is lower than any average contribution of 
the sellers also the classical Bertrand Edgeworth equilibria are less profitable to 
the sellers than the equilibria of the general case. We shall illustrate this in figure
3.
So existence of equilibria in the classical model only occurs for the extreme 
cases. Either competition among the sellers is so strong that no positive profits are 
sustainable in equilibrium or it is so weak that sellers would prefer more capacity 
even at the expense of increased competition. From this we conclude th a t the 
more general strategy space is more suitable for the study of price competition 
under capacity constraints. However so far we have concentrated on a single buyer 
completely sidestepping the (potential) problems arising from rationing.
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4. Several Buyers: Simultaneous M oves
With several buyers additional strategic considerations do arise for the sell­
ers. Not only do they have to worry about the pricing of the contracts but also 
do they have to decide about whom to offer what quantity of the constrained 
factor.
In the framework set out in section 2 this situation can be easily modelled 
since the seller s will offer a specific contract cfb to each individual buyer 6. 
Unequal treatm ent of the buyers by the sellers such as price discrimination (for 
identical quantities) is explicitly allowed. For consistency we shall require the 
total quantity on offer not to exceed the seller’s total capacity.
assum ption 3
d 9b — (%e b )P »b ) | ^  ^%»b ^
b
Thus sellers are explicitly forced to take their capacity constraints into ac­
count when quoting their offers. They have to decide, whom they will supply 
with what quantity in the case of excess demand. In other words we endoge- 
nize the rationing scheme in a very particular way: it is implied in the offers of 
“personalized” contracts.
This is in marked contrast to the common literature with linear prices, in 
which sellers only choose prices. The quantity allocation typically is chosen by 
an exogenously imposed rationing scheme 2 . In this literature all buyers face the 
same prices and choose sellers according to the best prices. Now it may occur that 
the seller with the best price cannot serve all demand. He therefore has to decide 
which buyers to accept and which to reject. The unsuccessful buyers are granted 
another chance to apply for the next seller, where they could be rationed again.
2 An exception to this is Davidson, Deneckere, 1986.
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This process might continue until all resources are sold. It turns out th a t mixed 
strategy equilibria intimately depend on the particular rationing scheme used by 
the sellers (Davidson, Deneckere, 1986 and Vives, 1986). On the other side pure 
strategy equilibria do not depend on the rationing schemes, whenever they exist 
(Osborne, Pitchik, 1986). Since it is our concern to analyze the existence problem 
in a more general strategic environment, we choose to allow full generality in the 
choice of contracts. Also we believe that the choice of a rationing mechanism may 
be an im portant strategic decision to capacity constrained firms.
Before we state the result let us give a definition. We shall call a seller s 
essential, if his resources are strictly necessary, i.e. if
x ,  > o , Y , X i  < Y . x " =  B X ‘
i j t « b
Otherwise he is called unessential. So in the language of corollary 1 the 
factors are scarce if there are essential sellers.
Proposition 3:
I f  7r(.) is strictly concave and there are at least two essential sellers no subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
If there is at most one essential seller a payoff unique subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium exists in pure strategies, in which all inessential sellers earn zero 
profits.
Before we give the proof it will be convenient to establish a general lemma 
about concave functions. The proof then is given in several steps. In step 2 the 
payoffs for a potential equilibrium are determined. Step 3 establishes the efficient 
use of resources. This implies th a t essential sellers will earn positive equilibrium 
payoffs (step 4), whereas unessential sellers will earn zero profits (step 5). Step 6 
establishes equilibrium in the relevant cases, whereas step 7 develops profitable 
deviations for the non-existence case thus concluding the proof.
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Lemma 2:
Let f  : IR  —► JR be strictly concave and A  > B , z  > 0. Then for any z < A — B:
f ( A  -  *) +  f ( B  + z )>  f ( A)  + / (B )
Proof:
The statem ent is equivalent to f ( A)  — f  (A — z) < f ( B  + z) — f ( B ) .  Now 
write : A = (A — B  — z) +  (B +  z). By sub-additivity, a property implied by any 
concave function f ( A)  < f ( A - B - z )  +  f ( B  + z) and likewise f ( A  — B  — z) < 
f ( A -  z) +  f ( B) .  Therefore
f ( A ) - f ( A - z )  < f ( A - B - z )  + f ( B  + z ) - f ( A - z )
= f ( B  + z ) + f ( A - B - z ) ~  f ( A  -  z)
< f ( B  + z ) ~  f ( B )
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
1. The proof is indirect. So let us consider a hypothetical Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies ctb = (x9b,x tb)
2. If we temporarily fix the equilibrium quantities x 9b as the maximal amounts 
seller s is willing to sell to buyer 6, proposition 1 allows us to calculate the 
potential equilibrium prices ptb as:
P » b  =  9>b  : =  ~  * 1 ^ 2  &ib
'  » '  i*»
Clearly, however, the equilibrium quantities are not fixed and we have to 
consider alternative quantity allocations.
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3. Claim:
In any hypothetical equilibrium resources are used efficiently, because oth­
erwise profitable deviations exist to exploit the inefficiencies. With identical and 
strictly concave profit functions this implies:
Proof of the claim:
If the statem ent is wrong, then there are buyers b and /? with different 
equilibrium purchases, such tha t
Now choose a seller s with x 9b > 0 and consider the strategy c9b =  (x 9b,p 9b), 
in which seller s reduces his sales to b by a sufficiently small amount z , which 
he uses to increase sales to buyer /?. At the same time he reduces the total price 
for his diminished contribution to b. However because of the concavity of 7r(.) he 
will be more than compensated by the additional income he will receive from ft.
So consider the deviation:
X ab =  X 9b -  Z , p 9b =  -  2 )  -
x a0 = X9l3 + z  , p9p = +  z j  -  n [ y 2 x i p )
'  t '
x . i  =  %e i  > P e i  =  P » i  *
Now because of the strict concavity of 7r(.) and lemma 2 we get 3
3 Use A = Yli ^ib 5 B  =  Yhi £**&> where A > B  because of the monotonicity
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P » b  P»f i  P t b  P b0
_  z ) +  + z )  ~
> 0
Hence the deviation is profitable and we have arrived at a contradiction 
which proves the claim.
4. From 2. and 3. we conclude that an essential seller s will enjoy positive equi­
librium profits, because there is at least one buyer b such th a t
Otherwise x eb =  0, for all b , gtb =  0 and
< W(X *)
i
which contradicts the optimality of c9b , since s could easily improve profits 
by offering resources x tb > 0 at sufficiently low but positive prices.
5. On the other hand we conclude tha t unessential sellers will earn zero profits 
in a potential pure strategy equilibrium.
To prove this statem ent assume to the contrary th a t the unessential seller a 
will earn zero profits in equilibrium, i.e. for some 6 : x„b > 0 , p„b > 0.
a. If there is some seller s with excess resources z < xab he can easily use those to 
undercut a  in competition for buyer 6. His profitable deviation is given by means 
of the following strategy:
o f  7 r(.)
53
%ab =  X 9b +  Z  , p tb  =  p 9b +  €
^ a j  ~  3 ' » j  J P a j  =  P a j  j J  ^  ^
with e small enough, such that
t ^  <r t <r
Contract c9b = (x 9b , p 9b) therefore increases buyer 6’s payoffs by at least e 
as compared to cffb and thus he will accept it. So c9b constitutes a profitable 
deviation for seller s.
b. If however no seller has excess resources the fact tha t o  is an unessential seller 
means that the aggregate equilibrium quantities of some buyer exceed X * , i.e. 
there is some buyer (3 such tha t
X > />  >  **
Now take some seller a with x 9p > 0  and consider the strategy, in which 
s reduces his supply to /? by a sufficiently small amount z  without affecting his 
payoff. Simultaneously he increases his sales to b by z  at a slight profit:
•Eab aft Z  ,  P a b  P a b  “1“ ^
X9p =  X , 0 -  z  , p 90 =  p 9p
X a j  =  * . /  ? P a j  = P a j  ,  j / M
such that
>  **
n ( y 2 x ik + z j  -  jt(  ) -  £ > 0
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This deviation is profitable as long as pab > 0 for the same reason as above 
thus establishing the contradiction.
In summary we conclude tha t in any potential pure strategy equilibrium any 
unessential seller will receive zero profits.
6. This already proves the second assertion of the proposition for the case of zero 
essential sellers, since obviously contracts at zero prices implement the equilib­
rium.
But also if there is only one essential seller s, in equilibrium all his rivals 
will offer zero prices. So he is the dearest source of resources and can only claim 
any remaining surplus. Hence an equilibrium is given by the following allocation 
(£»&)«&> in which all unessential sellers sell all their goods at zero prices, whereas 
the essential seller charges his marginal contribution for any remaining resources4
Characterization of equilibrium with one essential seller s :
= X  , p .h =  0 , v t
<7 5^  9
such that ^ x ab =  X a for
b
x , b = X-  -  X  , p,„ =  * ( * ')  -  w(X)
7. In the remaining case with at least two essential sellers 1 and 2 either all 
essential sellers only deal exclusively with one buyer in equilibrium or there are 
different buyers 6 ^  /?, who will both buy from essential sellers.
a. In the first case, if there is one buyer b such tha t x 9b > 0 and x sj =  0 for 
j  /  b all buyers except 6 receive resources from unessential sellers only.
4 In fact it is easily seen tha t this is the unique equilibrium since in any other 
(asymmetric) quantity allocation for the unessential sellers those could strictly 
increase their equilibrium payoffs in contradiction to step 5.
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In this situation an unessential seller can earn positive profits by undercutting 
an essential seller in competition for buyer b. This establishes a contradiction to
step 5. Hence this case does not constitute an equilibrium.
The case in which there are no inessential sellers is readily seen as not con-
his resources to buyer (3 at the higher price 7r(X, ) — e for j  = 1,2 and e small 
enough.
b. In the latter case there are buyers b and (3 such that
W ithout loss of generality choose 6 such that 6 >  E t  *
We consider the following profitable deviation for seller 1, which is directed 
to undercut seller 2 in competition for buyer /?.
x u =  XU , Pu =  Pu , i ^ b , ( 3
where z  is small enough, i.e. z  < ^m in(xlb, x2b)
This contract reduces the sales to“ b by an amount of z , tha t is used to 
undercut seller 2. Prices are chosen such tha t seller 2 will not trade with buyer 
(3 at all. The increase in seller l ’s payoff in this deviation is:
stituting an equilibrium either since each seller could profitably deviate by selling
xLb > 0  Pit, >  0
x2/3 > 0  p20 > 0
Rewriting this expression allows successive application of lemma 2.
+  z i ~  ’■ ' ( Z ^ ) +  * ( Z ^ )  -  "■( J 2  ^ ) - e
i;»£ 2 '  \ > * 2  '  * / 2  '  V '5 ^ 1 ,2  '
-  ’r(z^ ) + *(£*«>) - *(£*<*) + - z)
Using the concavity of tt we can apply lemma 2 and choose e > 0 small 
enough such that
*(2>') - ' ( n  £i*) _ + »(E*w) - 6
2 1 ,2  i  1
Again using concavity (lemma 2) and the assumption on aggregate capacities 
we find the remaining partial sum to be positive, i.e. the following inequality holds 
for small enough e
+ z) ~ mX*^) ~ mX^6) + mX^*6 “ z) > 6
\ ^ 2  '  2 '   ^ i  '  '  t '
Consequently, both components of the rise in revenues are positive and hence 
the deviation is profitable for small e.
So far we have only considered a single equilibrium contract of seller 2. The 
deviation proposed would not be feasible, if there were further contracts in seller 
2’s offer set that would be preferred by buyers b and /?. However, if one of the 
buyers prefers such a contract to the deviation offered by seller 1 he also prefers 
it to the original contractual offer, which was assumed to be in equilibrium. This 
is a contradiction and completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
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As the proof demonstrates it is the concavity of the surplus function com­
bined with the lack of commitment to particular buyers, which give rise to prof­
itable deviations from any proposed pure equilibrium strategy. However also with 
linear profit functions non-existence of equilibrium occurs.
Proposition 4:
If 7r(.) is linear, i.e. if n(x)  =  ax,  a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies exists and is payoff unique, if
a. either aggregate resources are very scarce, such that £ \  X, < BX*
b. or if there is at most one essential seller, in which case all unessential sellers 
earn zero profits.
Otherwise in the intermediate range with at least two essential sellers, no equi­
librium exists in pure strategies.
Proof:
1. As in step 2 of the proof of proposition 3 the hypothetical equilibrium prices 
can be calculated as p9b =  gsb for any fixed quantity allocation.
2. Now in case a) g9 J2b 9»b =  <*X9 for all sellers. Undercutting will invariably 
reduce the defiant’s profits , since all available resources are priced implicitly at 
the monopolistic per unit price a.
3. In b) either there are no essential sellers, in which case there are no effec­
tive capacity constraints and the standard Bertrand result obtains, or there is 
ju st one single essential seller s. In any equilibrium, in which the essential seller 
sells all his resources the unessential sellers can earn only zero profits, since 
they undercut each other in the Bertrand fashion. If he does not sell all his re­
sources the unessential sellers will also earn zero profits, since otherwise s can 
profitably undercut them by means of the spare resources. Therefore in equilib­
rium  unessential sellers offer their goods at a zero price and the s can earn no
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more than his remaining “marginal contribution” to aggregate surplus, which is
Bw( X ' )  -  B * ( Z .  1?) > 0 ■
4. So it is the remaining case, in which aggregate resources are abundant, but 
in which nevertheless there are at least two essential sellers. As above it can 
be argued that in a hypothetical equilibrium unessential sellers will earn zero 
profits charging zero prices. Therefore at least one of the essential sellers either 
has spare resources or can reduce sales to some buyer b with x ib > X* in a 
revenue neutral way, thus freeing resources for a deviation strategy. These excess 
goods now can be used in the standard way to undercut any essential rival seller. 
So equilibrium prices have to be zero for any seller, which however contradicts 
the fact that essential seller s should earn a positive payoff.
Q.E.D.
In the linear case there is an additional region, in which pure strategy equi­
libria exist. This occurs, when resources are so scarce tha t aggregate resources do 
not suffice to realize all the potential surplus. In this sense proposition 4 resem­
bles the results of Osborne and Pitchik (1986), who show the existence of unique 
mixed strategy equilibria for a capacity constrained duopoly with linear prices. 
They show that only in an “intermediate range” completely mixed strategies are 
employed, whereas in the “Bertrand region” as well as in the “monopoly region” 
pure strategies suffice.
In summary the existence question is intimately related to the number of 
essential sellers. If there is at most one of them a unique subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies always exists. W ith two sellers undercutting strate­
gies become individually profitable. Therefore, equilibrium requires tha t at most 
one seller earns positive equilibrium profits. This may occur either when the 
absolute market power of all sellers is large enough, such that no seller earns 
positive profits, or in monopoly like situations, in which exactly one seller enjoys 
significantly more relative market power than all of his rivals.
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Two or more essential sellers will compete to sell the “spare resources” at a 
slight profit. This is like the problem of the “hot potato” , in which each player 
just wants to get rid of it and passes it on to some of his competitors. Similarly 
here no essential seller wants to keep spare resources. Since there are no commit­
ment possibilities in the game even cooperative agreements such as proportionally 
disposing of the spare resources cannot occur in a pure strategy equilibrium.
This “hot potato” problem ceases, if aggregate resources are scarce and 
7r(.) is linear. With concave surplus functions however an additional motive for 
undercutting is given by the decreasing returns property. If a competitor were 
driven out, in principle higher payoffs could be realized by the others. This gives 
rise to deviations from any pure equilibrium strategy and there is no way the 
sellers could commit not to undercut each other.
In the last section we want to give two examples of different game forms, 
which implicitly allow for some commitment in situations of several successive 
decisions.
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5. Several Buyers: Sequential Moves
We want to conclude this chapter by giving an example, in which the se­
quential nature of the decision process allows enough implicit commitment to 
restore equilibrium in pure strategies.
This example is motivated by the proof of the non-existence result (propo­
sition 3). Non- existence basically occurs because the sellers cannot agree on a 
rationing scheme. If however there is a preceding stage, in which they have to 
decide and commit about the maximal amount of resources X 9b they are going to 
sell to each buyer 6, the strategic responses are limited and equilibrium obtains. 
Specifically we have in mind the following extensive form (B):
stage 0: Sellers s decide about maximal quantities X 9b, they want to offer
to buyer 6, such tha t J2b =  X 9
stage 1: sellers offer menus of contracts Ctb C JR+ , s =
stage 2: buyer 6 selects a set of contracts db =  (dLb, ...,d9b),
where d9b e  C9b U {(0,0)}
(0,0) := all offers rejected (of seller s)
This game form may be interpreted as a model with a hierarchical decision 
process. In the credit market we could think of the process of granting loans for 
example. While at a prior stage managers decide about the industry portfolio 
the specific loan to a particular client is arranged at a lower level under the 
constraints passed down.
For this game existence of equilibrium is readily shown.
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Proposition 5
The game described by game form (B) has subgame perfect Nash equilibria in 
pure strategies. They are characterized by c9b =  (x9b,p9b), such that:
= 7r , V6 and
Pub =  n ( j> 2 x ib\  -  * ( j 2 x ib\  , Vs
'  * '
Proof:
The proof follows immediately from step 2 of the proof of proposition 3. For 
any allocation (Xab) , t6 we can use proposition 1 to establish equilibrium for the 
corresponding subgame.
Now at stage 0 sellers effectively have to calculate the split of the surplus. 
Given the strategy choices of his rivals the best response of seller s is to offer 
his resources efficiently, i.e. to the buyers with the largest “marginal returns” . If 
he has spare resources, by means of corollary 3 (comparative statics) he cannot 
increase his profits by increasing his commitments. This would only lower the 
rivals’ equilibrium payoffs. Therefore, any efficient allocation x 9b will implement 
an equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
It is worth emphasizing that unessential sellers earning positive profits is 
compatible with equilibrium. So not surprisingly the commitment possibility 
strongly affects the nature of price competition.
A
Since any efficient allocation of the selling constraints X 8b will implement 
an equilibrium typically the payoffs will be different in alternative equilibria. For 
example in equilibria, in which all sellers treat their buyers identically and sell the
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same amount to each of them, competition among sellers is rather fierce. In this 
case aggregate payoffs for the sellers are lowest and maximal for the buyers. By 
building up exclusive relationships with their clients sellers can relax competition 
and claim larger parts of the surplus. This is spelled out rigorously in the next 
corollary.
Corollary 6
a.multiole equilibria:
There is a large multiplicity of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strate­
gies for the game defined by the game form (B). In general they exhibit different 
payoffs.
b. competitive equilibria:
The lowest payoffs for the sellers are associated with ucompetitive equilibria”, 
in which x8l =  ... =  x sB for all sellers.
c. relationship equilibria:
Let B  = n S  , n 6  IN . Then there are equilibria, in which each seller exclu­
sively deals with n buyers. In this case sellers earn all the available profits:
hb =  0 , V6
Proof:
The proof follows immediately from corollaries 2 and 3.
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Corollary 6 again highlights the tension between the monopolistic and com­
petitive elements in capacity constrained price games. Although quantity com­
mitments guarantee the existence of equilibrium now the choice of equilibrium 
is indeterminate and any allocation “between the two extremes” can be imple­
mented as an equilibrium.
Note that the commitment implies that the quantity decisions at stage 0 
are publicly observed by all rivals. Incomplete information about the quantity 
decisions leads back to the case of section 4 and non-existence of equilibrium. So 
the precise nature of repeated interaction is crucial for existence of equilibrium.
Thus, while dynamic interaction may restore pure strategy equilibria the 
only equilibrium property of efficiency in the sale of resources is fairly weak and 
leaves the choice of equilibrium largely indeterminate. So one could view the 
actual choice of equilibrium by the players as a coordination game in beliefs. In 
this context Edgeworth cycles may reappear although in pure strategies.
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6. Conclusion
This chapter addressed the question of equilibrium in capacity constrained 
price games. F.Y. Edgeworth was the first in 1897 to point out th a t the existence 
of pure strategy equilibria may be problematic. While his analysis is cast in a 
special model here the question has been studied in a more general framework 
allowing for non-linear prices and discriminatory pricing. Nevertheless, the re­
sults in im portant aspects accord with Edgeworth’s analysis. Existence of price 
equilibrium in simultaneous move games is problematic.
While Edgeworth suggests to resolve the non-existence in a dynamic inter­
pretation we find existence may be ascertained in a dynamic framework in which 
competitors can react to each others actions. On the other hand for the game 
form we present, a large variety of equilibria highlights the coordination prob­
lems among capacity constrained competitors. So Edgeworth cycles reappear in 
beliefs. While a “dynamic equilibrium” may exist in general it is not unique.
The implications of these findings for the proposed embedding of contract 
theory into a more general framework suggest tha t such a theory should be truly 
dynamic.
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Chapter 2
Intermediation in Search Markets
1. Introduction
2. The Model
3. A Monopolistic Intermediary
4. Price Competition among Intermediaries
5. Conclusion
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"Not the least o f the torments which plague our existence is the 
constant pressure o f time, which never lets us so much as draw 
breath but pursues us all like a taskmaster with a whip."
(Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Suffering of the World, 1851)
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Interm ediation in Search M arkets
1. Introduction
Mechanisms of price determination do vary considerably across different 
markets. There are personal markets, where agents meet more or less randomly 
and bargain about the price of the products they want to exchange such as 
bazaars or street markets for fruit, textiles or even transistor radios or watches. 
On the other side there are well organized markets, in which prices are determined 
according to well specified rules, as on the Stock Exchange, the Metal Exchange 
or the auction houses such as Christie’s or Sotheby’s. Also it is quite common 
to encounter list prices which are set by the manufacturers of durable goods. In 
those cases the dealers often have little discretion in granting discounts and little 
room for bargaining remains. Typically, the same would apply to supermarkets 
as well, where bargaining in general is not possible.
Accordingly, there are situations in which firms fix the prices of their prod­
ucts independently of the particular client they may face at the time. In a bazaar 
sellers would show far more flexibility and take into account the relative need of 
the buyer as well as his bargaining tactics. But again any trade will be conducted 
directly between buyers and sellers.
Auction markets, on the contrary, are intermediated markets, in which the 
products are either sold directly to or at least commissioned to an intermediary. 
Trade between buyers and sellers therefore is conducted indirectly. Since generally 
intermediaries’ services are costly to the traders, the question arises, why after 
all intermediaries are necessary.
68
Several aspects are discussed in the literature. One line of thought argues 
th a t intermediation may help to complete the market system in situations, in 
which asymmetric information causes market failure otherwise (Garella, 1989). 
Another line stresses economies of scale in the provision of incentive schemes 
(Diamond, 1984, Yanelle, 1988). Intermediaries might save on transaction (mon­
itoring) costs to the benefit of society and could be considered as part of an 
efficient mechanism minimizing the impact of informational costs.
In their paper about “middlemen” (1986) Rubinstein and Wolinsky pursue 
a totally different route. They incorporate intermediaries in a bargaining and 
matching framework. Intermediaries enjoy the advantage that their probabilities 
of meeting customers is higher than for customers meeting customers. In equilib­
rium  all agents may interact with each other. A buyer might happen to bargain 
either with an intermediary or a seller. In this sense both direct and indirect 
trade take place in equilibrium. However, neither buyers nor sellers can affect 
their matching probabilities by deliberately dealing with the intermediary. So 
the model is silent about explaining the advantages of intermediation.
In this paper we analyze markets in which intermediaries provide imme­
diacy. By their very presence in the market they can be contacted by buyers 
and sellers at any time. They quote prices, which can be observed by all m ar­
ket participants. Therefore searching for intermediaries is costless for all agents. 
However, intermediaries typically quote different buying (bid) and selling (ask) 
prices. Generally it does not pay to sell a product to the intermediary and re­
purchase it thereupon, since the price differential between ask and bid price is 
lost in such a round trip transaction. The implied bid-ask spread imposes costs 
of transacting for market participants. Therefore, they might find it profitable 
to search for a trading partner themselves and not deal with the intermediary at 
all. In this case they will incur search costs, which are endogenously determined 
in our model. So market participants have an active choice between transacting 
indirectly via intermediaries or directly on the search markets. We develop a 
market model, in which both markets are active in equilibrium.
The role of immediacy is particularly im portant in financial markets. There
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prices react continuously upon arrival of new information, which may affect the 
value of the underlying security. Since this information generally is revealed only 
gradually to market participants, either via direct communication or indirectly 
through the movement of prices, financial markets may face serious problems of 
asymmetric information. This is manifested in recurring debates about insider 
dealing as well as in the growing literature on optimal market micro structures 
(Milgrom, Glosten (1985), Kyle (1985), Roell (1987), Dennert (1989)). This lit­
erature concentrates on the design of optimal bid-ask-spreads for market makers 
in situations of “informed dealing” . To prevent a market break down, additional 
trading motives are necessary. Typically, these are modelled as “noise traders” , 
who may be considered as traders dealing for reasons unexplained by the model. 
Undoubtedly, asymmetric information will affect the design of the intermediaries’ 
price schedules. Yet, there has to be a prior motive for trade, which keeps the 
“noise” or “liquidity” traders in the market. It is this motive we concentrate on, 
sidestepping the impact of insider information.
In his seminal article “The Cost of Transacting” , Harold Demsetz (1968) 
develops the idea of immediacy to explain actually observed transaction costs at 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In his view, the exchange’s specialists 
provide the service of immediate order execution by maintaining inventories of 
shares. In markets with large price fluctuations such services might be of great 
value to customers. Intermediaries can recoup any opportunity costs and position­
ing risks they incur, by charging positive bid-ask spreads. He develops a model, 
in which transaction costs are entirely determined by the costs of providing the 
service of immediacy.
Although the “specialists” for a particular stock at the NYSE are regulated 
monopolists, Demsetz argues verbally tha t there should be enough competitive 
pressure from related and rival markets so as to avoid excessive spreads. “Com­
petition of several types will keep the observed spread close to cost. The main 
types of competition emanate from (1) rivalry for the specialist’s job, (2) com­
peting markets, (3) outsiders who submit limit orders rather than market orders, 
(4) floor traders who may bypass the specialist by crossing buy and sell orders
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themselves, (5) and other specialists” (Demsetz, 1968, p.43). Thus, competitive 
pressure should guarantee fairly competitive pricing of the specialist. Observed 
positive bid-ask spreads therefore are reliable measures of the cost of intermedia­
tion. So, while leaving the confines of his model, Demsetz implicitly relies on the 
beneficial effects of price competition.
The recent literature on two sided price competition however contests such 
a view. It demonstrates the sensitivity of equilibria of price setting games on 
the exact nature of competition. Stahl (1988) and Yanelle (1988) offer examples 
of two sided price competition, in which non-Walrasian equilibria with positive 
bid- ask spreads emerge, even when the intermediation technology is costless. 
These examples hinge on the impossibility of short sales. In such a non-Walrasian 
equilibrium intermediaries offer attractive bid prices and hence virtually attract 
all sellers. This gives them a monopoly position towards buyers. The examples 
given by Stahl and Yanelle are given in a static context, but it is not clear, 
how dynamic considerations should annihilate these phenomena. Furthermore, 
even the existence of equilibrium may be problematic in intermediated markets. 
(Yanelle, 1988).
This calls for a rigorous treatm ent of the intuition developed above. In such 
a framework then also the question can be addressed, to what extent an inter­
m ediary’s liberty to set prices will be constrained by the various sources of com­
petition. In particular, how will bid-ask spreads and the nature of competition 
among intermediaries depend on frictions in the market for direct transactions 
between buyers and sellers?
Our model formalizes Demsetz’s central insight: organized markets reduce 
the impact of trading frictions.Therefore, these frictions which give rise to the 
intermediated market are modelled explicitly in the direct exchange market. It 
takes time to find a suitable trading partner and to negotiate the price. Interme­
diaries, by offering fixed prices, stand ready to speed up the process of exchange. 
Their price quotes are widely visible and therefore allow traders to trade with­
out delay, provided the intermediary can satisfy the order at all. To provide this 
service, intermediaries are guided by the principle of gain in charging bid and
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ask prices. However, they are bound by competition from rival intermediaries 
as well as from the search market. In fact, we shall see that the presence of 
this search market qualitatively changes the nature of competition among the 
intermediaries. In addition, they have to compete against the search market and 
cannot exploit a monopoly position as in the examples discussed above. Com­
petition among several intermediaries is shown to result in Walrasian outcomes. 
It depresses bid-ask spreads down to zero. Consequently, buyers and sellers can 
transact at Walrasian prices and zero transaction costs via the intermediaries. In 
the absence of any costs for the intermediation services the Walrasian auctioneer 
can be replaced by competing intermediaries.
If, however, there are fixed costs of entry into the intermediation business, 
the natural industrial structure is tha t of a natural monopoly in the sense of 
Shaked and Sutton (1983). In their definition an industry is a natural oligopoly, 
when the number of firms entering the industry is bounded independently of the 
size of the economy. Thus, in a natural oligopoly the convergence to a fragmented 
industrial structure is explicitly prevented, as the economy grows large. Here, in 
equilibrium only one intermediary enters. He charges positive spreads. In the 
choice of prices, however, he is constrained by competition against the search 
market. In equilibrium, typically, the search market is active. Buyers and sellers 
with large gains from trade prefer intermediated trade, whereas traders with 
lower gains engage in search.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the general model. 
Section 3 analyzes the case of a monopolistic intermediary, competing against 
the search market. Section 4 also allows for competition among intermediaries. 
Finally, section 5 concludes by discussing the implications for the industrial struc­
ture of the intermediation business.
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2. The M odel
Let us consider a market for a perishable homogeneous product. Three types of 
market participants will be active on this market, buyers, sellers and intermedi­
aries.
We assume a continuum of ultimate traders, i.e. of buyers and sellers. They 
want to trade at most one unit of an indivisible product. Their preferences are 
described by reservation prices, which for both are assumed to be uniformly 
distributed along the unit interval, r G [0,1] , thus generating linear market 
supply and demand functions, which give rise to a unique Walrasian equilibrium.
preferences:
buyer Uok (r) =  r -  pt
seller U0v (s) =  pt — s
r, s := reservation prices
pt := price of transaction at period t
supply and demand functions:
S'(p) =  p
D(p)  =  1 — p , where p G [0,1]
Furthermore, we assume the reservation prices of all market participants to 
be private information. Only the aggregate distributions of types, G0 (.) and F0 (.), 
and therefore supply and demand function are common knowledge. So in princi­
ple all traders can calculate Walrasian equilibrium prices and the corresponding 
allocations. However since there is no auctioneer quoting market clearing prices 
and coordinating the trading activities, the agents are forced to establish the 
equilibrium allocation by their own actions, which does imply costly search for 
trading partners and some sort of price bargaining.
Alternatively, they may trade with intermediaries, who in contrast to the 
auctioneer, will quote prices with the purpose of generating profits. Typically
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these prices will not be market clearing in the Walrasian sense and inefficient 
allocations do result.
Search Market
When traders choose to enter the search market we shall assume tha t buyers 
and sellers are matched at random by some matching technology. The number of 
agents on the two sides of the market may differ. The technology will be such that 
each market participant on the short side of the market will be matched with 
some probability A E [0,1] with an agent of the opposite type. The matching 
probabilities of agents on the long side consequently are adjusted by the relative 
numbers and therefore less than A. The probability of being matched to a partic­
ular subset of trading partners will be the same for all subsets of the same size 
(i.e with the same Lebesgue measure) on the same market side. In the symmetric 
case of equally many sellers and buyers in the search market A is simply the 
probability of being matched for any participant. This is the continuous analog 
of assuming that the probability of being matched to a particular partner will be 
constant for all possible partners. Such a technology can easily be shown to exist 
for the discrete case.
Once a match is established the traders will engage in negotiations about the 
price of the product. Since they do not know their counterpart’s reservation price, 
sequential bargaining may become quite complex (Rubinstein, 1985). Therefore 
we choose to model the bargaining process in a highly simplified version. Nature 
selects one of the partners at random to announce a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which 
the counterpart may accept or reject. Upon acceptance trade is accomplished. 
After rejection however, the trading opportunity is lost and the traders leave the 
market all together.
For technical reasons we shall also assume tha t only traders, who expect 
positive utility from trading will enter the market. This will prevent the market 
from being “overcrowded” by agents unwilling or incapable of trading, i.e. with an 
expected value from trade of zero. Since these superfluous traders could affect the 
matching probabilities, we prefer to exclude them by means of this assumption.
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We could also have introduced a small entry cost for the search market. Since this 
however would complicate equilibrium calculations considerably, we also discard 
this possibility and prefer to think of the limit of vanishing entry costs.
So essentially the implicit cost of search for traders consists of the probability 
of disagreement in a particular match, which urges them to delay trade by one 
period.
Intermediaries
Alternatively traders may choose to deal immediately with the intermediaries at 
the quoted prices. We shall assume that the intermediaries i = 1 , . . . , /  quote fixed 
ask- and bid prices (a ,, 6t ), which are visible for the whole market. For the period 
in question they are committed to these prices for any transaction they engage in. 
As long as they face the same number of buyers and sellers at the prices quoted 
they can easily match their clients and service all deals. In case of a mismatch 
however they cannot serve all customers on one side of the market. For this 
contingency we assume th a t they randomly ration the side of the market they 
cannot serve fully. In fact the intermediaries price commitments are contingent on 
their (personal) ability to m atch the two market sides. They will never experience 
bankruptcy. We shall neglect the possibility that the intermediary enters the 
search market to satisfy remaining customers. So their profits are q(a — 6), where 
q is the number of traders on the short side of the market.
Consequently, the attraction of dealing with the intermediary for the traders 
depends critically on the probability of being served at the quoted prices. Typi­
cally in equilibrium this probability will be very high since intermediaries profits 
are proportional to the trading volume with the spread as proportionality factor. 
So market participants essentially have to trade off a relatively firm quote of the 
intermediary against its price.
If on the other side all market participants expect the intermediary to be 
unable to generate any positive transaction volume, based on such a belief it is 
preferable not to deal with him.
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Let buyer r ’s and seller s ’s choice of market be defined by dk (r) G { 0 , 1 , 1} U 0 
and dv (s) G { 0 , 1 , . . . , / }  U 0, where 0 denotes the search market, i the respective 
intermediary and 0 the choice not to enter at all.
Information
Only intermediaries are assumed to have access to an information technology 
which allows to inform all potential traders uniformly. This technology may be 
thought of a broadcasting or a computer network or simply a newspaper. If access 
was not restricted each trader could quote prices himself. However, we have in 
mind tha t access to the technology is costly and in consequence only few agents 
will acquire it.
Intermediaries’ price quotes, therefore, are public information. Also the dis­
tributions of buyers and sellers F0 (r) and G0 (s) are public information which 
incorporates an element of rational expectations about the commodity’s scarcity 
value.
Trader’s reservation prices, however, are private information. It is this in­
formational friction, which makes trade costly. Even in equilibrium these private 
valuations will not be revealed completely even though the choice of transaction 
of a particular trader is informative to some extent. If a buyer prefers interme­
diated trade his valuation should exceed the ask price. The precise valuation 
however may never be discovered by other market participants. Also the identity 
of their clients is assumed to be private information of the intermediaries. So the 
choice at stage 2 is (partially) observed only by intermediaries.
Game Form
Let us summarize the model and define the exact pattern of timing in the 
decisions of the particular game form T to base our further analysis upon. It is 
convenient to model the different “decision stages” as a multistage game.
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Extensive form T
stage 1:
The intermediaries choose ask and bid prices (a*, 6*), i =  1 , . . . , / ,  to which 
they will be committed for the period under consideration.
stage 2:
Buyers and sellers choose the market they want to enter, if at all 
dk (r) £ { 0 ,1 , 1}  U 0 and dv (s) £ { 0 ,1 , 1}  U 0
0 :=  search market
1 :=  intermediary, i £  {1 ,...,/}
0 :=  no activity
stage 3:
Nature matches randomly the players in the search market and determines 
who will make the first and final offer.
Furthermore, nature rations randomly the long sides of any mismatched 
positions of the intermediaries.
stage 4:
Market participants as determined by the random process supply a take-it- 
or-leave-it offer.
stage 5:
Their matching partners accept or reject the offer. Acceptance completes 
the trade, whereas rejection leaves the players unsatisfied.
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The specific extensive form chosen does imply some form of commitment 
of the intermediaries to their price quotes. In particular, once the traders have 
chosen their market we do not allow them to renegotiate the price with the in­
termediaries at stage 3. Given that also the intermediaries do not know their 
customers’ identity, i.e. reservation price, this assumption does not seem too 
restrictive however. Although the intermediary might be willing to grant conces­
sions to low valuation traders, he would rather prefer to extract more surplus 
from high valuation traders.
Equilibrium Concept
We are interested in the| subform perfect Nash equilibria of the game de­
scribed so far. Before we can formally define an equilibrium the players’ payoffs 
have to be determined.
Buyers’ and sellers’ payoffs consist of the surplus which can be generated 
in a particular transaction and of the probability of trade actually taking place 
at the given transaction. It will be im portant to distinguish between two com­
ponents of the probability of trade. Trade may fail to take place because the 
intermediary has to ration one side of the market. In this case the short side of 
the market determines the intermediary‘s transaction volume, which in general 
will be positive.
On the other hand it is readily evident that an intermediary will be unable 
to generate any positive transaction volume when everybody expects him not to 
be active in business. In this case potential clients will rationally expect the inter­
mediary not to be able to fulfil his price offers. Therefore they abstain from trade 
with him at any price quote. Obviously, this phenomenon stems from common 
conjectures of market participants.
By fiki (r) and p vi (s) we shall denote the probability buyer r or seller s assign 
to the event of intermediary i actually being able to trade at the prices quoted. 
So for any choice dk (r) 6  { ! ,. .. ,/}  and dv (s) £ { ! ,. . . , /}  buyer r ‘s and seller s‘s
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payoffs are tt k (r) =  juk,dk(r)(r)(r -  adk(rt) and wv (s) =  , (s)(bdv{l>) -  s)
respectively. If traders prefer to remain inactive their payoffs are zero and if they 
select the search market they receive the expected utility from search, which will 
be defined more rigorously in the next section.
Intermediary i ’s payoff, iG  { 1 ,...,/} , is determined by 7rt =  q{ — b{), where 
<7* := min {^({r | dk (r) =  *}), */({s | £w(s) =  *})} with the Lebesgue measure v.
A Nash equilibrium is a constellation ((o>i1bi )Ii_ L , (<?*(**))» ( i  (6))) such tha t
(a ,, b{) G argmax ^  V*
A
dk (r) G argmax nk (r) Vr 
dv (s) G argmax ir„ (s) Vs
The Nash equilibrium is | subform perfect if it induces a Nash equilibrium in
eachl subform .1
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3. A M onopolistic Intermediary
a) Characterization of Equilibria
Before we get into the intricacies of competition among the intermediaries in 
section 4, let us consider the case of a monopolistic intermediary.
In order to derive his optimal pricing strategy the monopolist has to know 
the market reaction to his price quotes. So we start analyzing the choice problem 
for the market participants at temporarily given prices and later determine the 
optimal spread. Let a £ [0,1] denote the monopolist’s ask price and b £ [0,1] his 
bid price. (Since we consider a single intermediary in this section, we suppress 
the subscript t.)
As a first trivial observation we note tha t for any positive bid-ask-spread the 
search market will be active. This is true as sellers with reservation prices above 
the intermediary’s bid price 6 and buyers with a valuation below the ask price a 
can obtain a gain from trade only on the search market.
Observation 1:
For any positive bid ask spread, a — b > 0, there will be some traders actively 
trading in the search market.
Now let G(s) and F(r) be the conditional equilibrium distribution functions 
of sellers and buyers active in the search market. Buyer r ’s utility Uk (r) when 
entering the search market consists of three components. If he is lucky, he finds 
a trading partner and receives the right to supply a take-it-or-leave-it bid. Oth­
erwise he may still find a matching partner and respond passively accepting or 
rejecting a bid and finally in the worst case he might not even find a partner on
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the search market. His utility therefore consists of the value of the bidder’s game 
plus the value of the respondent’s game weighted by the appropriate probabilities. 
The same applies to the seller’s utility Uv (s).
In order to determine the value of the search game for a bidder we have 
to define his optimal bid for given conditional distributions of sellers G(s) and 
buyers F (r)  active in the search market. Let x(r) and y(s) denote the buyer’s 
and the seller’s bid. In case buyer r ’s bid is accepted, he receives utility r — x(r). 
So he has an incentive to bid a low price. On the other side by lowering the bid 
he also reduces the probability of the bid being accepted because only sellers 
with reservation prices s < x(r) might accept. This trade-off between maximal 
surplus and a high probability of trade determines the actual offer.
A passive matching partner will accept a bid only as long as his utility gain 
is positive. So buyer r ’s utility is m ax{0,r — t/(s)} in case seller s has the right 
to bid. Likewise seller s ’s utility is max{0,a;(r) — s} when it is buyer r to bid.
Define the expected utility from search as the sum of the expected value from 
bidding and the value of the subgame, in which the matching partner offers a bid. 
We shall do this for the special case, in which the total numbers of sellers and 
buyers in the search market are equal since the general case is readily established 
by adjusting the respective utilities by the relative measure of traders on the 
“long” side of the market. Buyer r expects the following utility from search:
u t ( r ) =  (r  -  zW ) dG(a) + (> y(s)) dG(s)
Likewise the sellers’ utility attainable from search can be written as:
Besides search market participants may as well choose intermediated trade. 
In this case the value of an intermediated transaction will depend on the sur­
plus, which can be attained at a given price quote of the intermediary and the 
probability of trade actually taking place. If the intermediary can match the ap­
plication of a particular client, this value is simply the difference between the 
client’s reservation price and the intermediary’ s quote. In case the monopolist 
cannot match all clients, there is either a chance a k < 1 or a v < 1 tha t a buyer
or a seller has to be rationed. Then the value of intermediation for buyer r and
seller s , Wk (r) and Wv (s), can be given by:
Wfc (r) =  OLk (r -  a)
Wv (s) =  a v (b -  s)
In equilibrium, clearly, at most one market side will be rationed, i.e.
m ax{afc, a B} =  1.
Market participants compare the utility from search with the value of a 
transaction via the intermediary. They will deal with the intermediary only if
w k (r) > U„ (r) or 
Wv(s) > V .{ s )
Alternatively, if neither intermediated trade nor search yields market partic­
ipants a chance to engage in profitable trade they might decide to remain inactive 
at all.
In order to classify traders according to their preferred mode of transaction 
in equilibrium a monotonicity property is quite useful. If in equilibrium buyer r 
chooses to remain inactive, then also all buyers r' < r remain inactive. Clearly, 
should buyer r ' strictly prefer search or even intermediated trade buyer r could 
as well imitate the strategy of r' and attain  at least the same level of utility. 
Symmetrically if seller s remains inactive in equilibrium all sellers s' > s will 
choose to remain inactive. Observe tha t seller 1 and buyer 0 never can achieve
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positive gains from trade and therefore abstain from trade. Denote the set of 
buyers remaining inactive by Ok and the set of inactive seller by Ov . Accordingly, 
in equilibrium these sets are convex and bounded.
Observation 2
In equilibrium the sets of inactive buyers Ok and inactive sellers Ov are closed 
and convex sets such that 0 E Ok and 1 E Ov.
For the search market a similar monotonicity property can be established. 
In particular in the next observation we demonstrate that if in equilibrium buyer 
r chooses search then there is no buyer r' < r who prefers intermediated trade. 
So r ' either enters the search market as well or remains inactive. Together with 
the previous observation this implies that the set of buyers who strictly prefer 
search to intermediated trade is a convex set. A symmetric statem ent holds for 
sellers, where Sv denotes the set of sellers who strictly prefer search to any other 
transactional form. If more buyers than sellers enter the search market denote 
the degree of mismatch by (3k. In other words (3k =  max ( l ,  ), where i/(S)
denotes the measure of set S.  Analogously /?„ =  max ( l ,  ). So the sets Sk
and Sv are simply Sk =  {r | (IkUk (r) > W*(r)} and Sv = {s \ (3VUV (s) > W„(s)}.
Observation 3
In equilibrium the sets Sk of buyers and Sv of sellers who strictly prefer search 
to intermediated trade are convex sets.
Proof:
1) In order to prove this claim we establish the monotonicity property. Let r0 E Sk 
and s0 E Sv be buyers and sellers who strictly prefer search in a given equilibrium. 
Then we establish that any buyer r < ro and any seller s > s0 in equilibrium 
will not deal with the intermediary, i.e. r £  Ik and s £  Iv . Since {r | r  <  r0}
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and Ok are convex subsets of the real line also Sk as the complement of Ok in 
{r | r < r0} is a convex set. Likewise Sv is convex.
2) In equilibrium at most one side of the market will be rationed. So either a k = 1 
and a v < 1 or a k <  1 and a v =  1. In step 2 we shall establish the monotonicity 
property for the first case while for the latter case it will be proved in the next 
step.
As a k =  1 there may be fewer buyers on the search market than sellers and 
therefore j3k < 1.
Now let us establish the monotonicity property for buyers. So consider buyer 
r <  r0. By assumption Wk (r0) < (3k Uk (r0).
Recall
u *(r) =  7; f  (r -  x(r)) dG{s) +  ^  f  (r -  y(s)) dG{s)
*  * » < x (  r )  "  " V { 8 ) < r
Wk (r) =  a k (r -  a)
Imitating the bidding strategy x(r0) of buyer r0 in general is not optimal 
for buyer r and his utility from bidding his best bid x(r) will certainly not be 
lower. So we get the following list of inequalities, which ultimately demonstrate 
(3k Uk (r) > W*(r )* This is a contradiction to our maintained hypothesis.
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u k {r) > \ f  (r  — x(r0)) <2G(s) +  ^  /  (r -  S/M) dG(s)
"  J  » <  ac ( r  o ) "  ^ y ( « ) < r
=  ^ (  [  (r0 -  x(r0)) dG(s) + f  (r0 -  y(s)) dG(s)
\ J » < x { r  o)  d y [ g ) < r
~  f  ( r o ~  r ) d < 3 (s )  ~  f  ( r o ~  r )  d G ( s ) " )
« / « < * ( r 0 ) d y [ g ) < r  /
=  (r° _ x (ro)) dGis) +  f  (r0 -  y(s)) dG(s)
-  f  (r0 — r) dG(s) -  f  (r0 -  r) dG(s)
• / « < * (  r 0 )
-  /  (r0 -  y(«)) rfG(a))
Thus we find the first two integrals to equal Uk (r0). Since by assumption 
ctk =  1 it follows (3k Uk (r0) > r0 — a and we find the following sequence of 
implications:
/%Uk (r) >(3kUk (r0) -  ^  (  f  (r0 -  r) dG(s) +  f  (r0 -  r) dG(s) \
\ J » < x { r  o )  * ' v ( « ) < r  o /
>PkUk (r0) -  X(r0 — r)i/(Sv)
> PkUk (r0) -  (r0 -  r)
> r — a 
=  W*(r)
Consequently r £  Ik .
3) If a k < 1 necessarily av = 1. By symmetry a result analogous to step 2 holds 
for sellers. In this case for s0 € Sv implies s 0  I v for all s > s0. Hence, buyers
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with valuations r £ Iv cannot expect any profitable trade and remain inactive. 
Accordingly, t/(Iv +  Sv) = i/(Ik +  Sk), which implies (3k =  1 in this subcase.
As in the previous step we consider an imitation strategy, in which some 
buyer r attem pts to im itate the search strategy of some buyer r0. Accordingly 
the following relations hold:
Uk (r) > \ (  (r  -  x(r„)) dG(s) +  |  f  (r -  y(a)) dG{s)
= \ { (  (r0 - x ( r 0)) <fG(s) +  f  (r0 - y ( a ) ) \  dG(a)
_j_ _  (r _  ro) (  f  dG(s) +  /  dG(s) \
V«/«<x(r0 ) /
= £M r0) +  ^  (r ~ r o )  (  f  dG(s) +  f  dG(s) \
\ * ' « <  arft"o) • ' v ( » ) < r 0 /
Depending on the sign of f f / , Sl(ro) dG{s) +  /„ („ < ro dG{a)j  two cases 
have to be considered.
s ( / . £ . ( r . )  dGW  +  /„(.)<.„ dG(5) )  ^
In this case choose r >  r0. Using the imitation strategy for buyer r we get 
the inequality:
Uk (r) >  Uk (r0) +  (xk (r — r0)
=  Uh(r0) ~  ock {r0 -  a) +  ak (r -  a)
Now r0 € Sk implies r £ Sk for any r > r0. In equilibrium Wk (a) =  0 and
Uk (a) > 0. This statement clearly holds for a > b since then buyer a will be
able to generate positive surplus with a positive probability. Also if a =  6 seller 
b will have positive search utility Uv(b) > 0 as long as v{Ik ) > 0. Accordingly,
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Sv includes a positive measure of sellers with reservation prices less than b. This 
implies Uk (a) > 0. Accordingly with the above result v{Ik) =  0 which contradicts 
the assumption a k <  1. Therefore this case cannot occur in equilibrium.
") 2 ( / .< * ( r.) dG (S) +  /„(.>< ro rfGW )  < “ *
Here consider some buyer r < r0. For him the following relation holds:
Uk (r) > Uk (r0) -  a k (r0 -  r)
=  Uk (r0) -  a k (r0 -  a) +  ak (r -  a)
Accordingly, r0 G Sk implies r £  Ik for any r <  r0, the monotonicity prop­
erty.
\ 4) Finally by a completely symmetric argument the monotonicity property also
holds for sellers.
Q.E.D.
In conclusion it follows readily tha t the sets Ik and Iv of buyers and sellers 
choosing intermediated trade are convex sets. If they are not empty they contain 
the traders with the largest potential gains from trade.
Observation 4
In equilibrium Ik and I v are convex sets such that 0 G I v if t^(Iv) > 0 and 1 G Ik 
if v ( I k ) > 0 .
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By way of summarizing in equilibrium we can decompose the set of buyers 
into disjoint set Ik , Sk and Ok such that Ik U Sk U 0 k =  [0,1] and 0 £ Ok and 
1 G / fc. Likewise Iv U Sv U Ov — [0, l] represents the partition of the set of sellers, 
where 0 G / „  and 1 G Ov.
Next existence of equilibrium will be analyzed. Indeed we find an equilibrium 
in which all the subsets of the decomposition have positive measure. This is stated 
in the first result of this section.
Result 1
a) The intermediation game has a |subform perfect Nash equilibrium, which is 
characterized as the unique solution of
Wk ( l - c )  =  Uk (l - c )
Wv(c) = Uv (c)
at the equilibrium prices of
*(\\  ^ A
=  4 ~  8
* 1 A
* W  =  i  +  i
b) There is a critical seller c(A) =  J- such that sellers s G [0, c] and buyers 
r £ [1 — c, 1) choose to transact with the intermediary. Buyers and sellers from 
[c, 1 — c] will enter the search market, whereas remaining agents cannot profitably 
trade in any market.
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Proof:
By virtue of the observations above if in equilibrium a > b then the search 
market will be active and the sets of buyers and sellers trading with the inter­
mediary can be written as intervals Iv =  [0, cv ] and Ik = [ck , 1] unless Iv =  0 or 
Ik = 0. This immediately implies Ok = Iv = [0,c„]. Buyer r < cv will find no 
trading partner on the search market since all potential sellers with lower valua­
tions prefer intermediated trade. In equilibrium r cannot deal profitably with the 
intermediary either and therefore remains inactive. Likewise Ov = Ik = [cfc, 1]. 
Consequently, the sets of agents active in search are identical Sv = Sk =]c„,cfc[. 
So in equilibrium /?fc = /3V = 1 . Moreover, in equilibrium cv < ck since otherwise 
the monopolist quotes prices that generate losses. We shall see that indeed in 
equilibrium a > b. So the intermediary can earn positive revenues.
This characterization of the search market allows a simple representation of 
the optimal bid schedule for any trader considering entry into the search market. 
In step 1 the optimal bid schedule is derived, while in step 2 the utility from 
search is determined. This allows to explicitly calculate the critical valuations 
ck and cv as functions of the monopolist’s price quotes in step 3. In step 4 we 
establish that in equilibrium the intermediary quotes symmetric prices a = 1 — 6 
and finally in the last step 5 the optimal spread is determined.
step 1:
For buyers r G Sk the optimal bid can be calculated as follows: 
x(r) : =  argmax / (r — x(r)) dG(s)
J  » <  *  ( r  )
M x
---------- (r — x(r)) ds
ck -  cv
=  argmax (r — x(r)) (x(r) — c„)
_  r +  c„
2
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=  argmax
Likewise for s E Sv:
y(s) : = argmax /  (y(s) -  s) dF(r )
d  y ( » ) < r  
f c k j
=  argmax /  (j/(5) — s ) dr
Jyi«) Cfc ~  cv
=  argmax (cfc -  y(s)) (y(s) -  s)
Cfc +  S
step 2:
Using the optimal bid schedule in equilibrium the utility of participation in 
the search market can be calculated for r  G Sk and s 6 Sv
u k(r) =  ^  f  (r — x(r)) dG(s) +  ^  f  (r -  y(s)) dG(s)
"  J  » < x [ r )  "
*  ( r ) \  -I r 2 r - c kA 1
2 cfc 
A 1
2 cfc 
A
~ c v
1
2 Cfc -  c„
A 1
2 Cfc
A
-  Cv  
1
8 Cfc -  c„
r l ' r| r  ~  d6 +  A 1 2 r ~ Ck~ Sds
2 2 Cfc — c„ J c9 2
(r c.) +  I (2 r  -  cfc)(2r -  cfc -  cv)
4 2
|2 1
-  +  - (2 r  — cfc - c v):
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Analogously
A 1
2 cfc -  c
r +  cv - 2 s
I  (s/(«) - s ) d F (r) +  x  /  (*M  - s ) d F (r)
J r > y { s )  *  J x ( r ) > a
-  f  { v ( s ) ~ s )d r  +  ^  1 f  ( x ( r ) - s ) d i
v J y ( s )  Z  Ck  C„  J 2 9 - c%
=  a _ l _  r *  +  a — i—  r
2 Cfc J y [ g )  2 2 Cfc c„ y2<_c,
A 1 / ( s  — Cfc)2 1
=  — 5— +  2(2 a - c»)(2 5 - c‘ - c”)
-  i ( 2 S - c „ ) 2 + j c 2)
= - — —  +  i(2 s  — ck — c„)2)
2ct -c„V 4 4 /
= ^ Ct^ e ( [ s ~ ch Y  +  ( 2 « - c k - c „ ) 2)
In particular the utility levels of the critical traders ck and c„ are identical 
and can be determined as
Uk (^ fc) Uv (c„) ~  (Cfc cv)
Buyers with larger valuations r € Ik and sellers with lower valuations s £ Iv 
according to observation 3 expect at least Uk (cfc) or Uv (c„) respectively since 
they could always immitate the bidding behaviour of the critical agents. Any 
remaining traders cannot profitably trade.
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step 3:
On the other hand at given prices (a,b) the value of intermediated trade 
can be easily determined for the critical buyers and sellers ck and cv by Wk (ck) 
and Wv (cv). Since these critical agents are defined by indifference between search 
and intermediated trade and since W3- and U3- , j  = k , v  are continuous functions 
their valuations have to satisfy the following equation system:
Uk (ck) = Wk (ck)
U.(e.) = Wv {cv )
Since at most one side of the intermediated market has to be rationed at 
most one of ak and a v is less than 1. W ithout loss of generality let us assume 
0 < 1 — C/t < c„ or in other words av < 1 and a k = 1. Now, using the result of 
step 2, the equation system reads:
Cfc d
1  f  l  \  ( b - c v)
cv
or equivalently
Cfc a
  ( i > - C v )
Cv
- ( c k - c v) =
Cfc — d  =
- ( C f c  -  cv) =
^  (Cfc -  cv) =
90
The second equation implies 6 (1 — ck) = (1 — a) cv. Given cv > 1 — ck this 
implies further 6 > 1 — a or equivalently a > 1 — 6. In equilibrium sellers can only 
be rationed if the ask price a is more distant from the hypothetical Walrasian 
equilibrium price of J than the bid price 6.
Straightforward algebraic transformation of the second equation yields:
1 -  1  ~ a1
This can be inserted into the first equation to yield after some elementary 
manipulation
. 4(1 — a) — A
C” =  * (4 -  A)(l -  a) -  A6
Finally the trading volume can be determined for the case a k =  1 at prices 
a > 1 — 6 as
, . 4(1 — a) — A
l - c fc =  ( 1 - a ) (4 — A) (1 — a) — A b
Symmetrically, for prices a < 1 — 6 in equilibrium buyers will be rationed 
and a v = 1. Analogously, one finds
4 6 - A 
(4 -  A)6 -  A(1 -  a)
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step 4:
Next we demonstrate equilibrium prices to be symmetric relative to the
A
hypothetical Walrasian equilibrium price, i.e. a =  1 — 6.
A
In order to prove this claim assume to the contrary a > 1—6, which according 
to step 3 implies c„ > 1 — ck. We shall establish tha t the following deviation 
(a, 6) is profitable for the monopolist for small enough e. This contradicts the
A
maintained assumption. By symmetry also the case a < 1 — 6 can be ruled out 
in equilibrium and the claim will be established.
a =  a — e
b = b — e
^  A
The deviation does not affect the spread, a — b = a — b. We shall find however 
that the deviation increases trading volume. In order to establish 1 — ck > 1 — ck 
the following inequality has to be satisfied:
(i -  a) — 4<1: °) _ .  > (i _ a) — 4(4 ~ a) ~ A „
( 4 - A ) ( l - 5 ) - W  (4 — A)(l — a) — b\
a < a implies directly 1 — a > 1 — a. For the remaining factors we claim
4(1 -  a) -  X  4(1 -  a) -  X
(4 -  A)(l -  a) -  bX (4 -  A)(l -  a) -  6A
This claim is established by going backwards the following sequence of equiv­
alent relations
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4((1 - a ) -  A) ((4 -  A) (1 -  a) -  bX) >
(4(1 -  a) -  A) ((4 -  A)(l -  a) -  bX)
4((1 -  a +  e) -  A) ((4 -  A)(l -  a) -  bX) >
(4(1 -  a) -  A) ((4 -  A)(1 — a +  e) — (6A -  e))
4(4 — A)( l  — a +  e) (1 — a) — (4 — A)A(1 — a) — 46A(1 — a +  e) +  6A2 >
4(4 — A)(l  — a +  e ) ( l  — a) — (4 — A)A(1 — a -f- e)
— 4(6A — e)A(l  — a) +  (6 — e)A2
—46Ae >  — (4 — A)Ae +  4Ac(l  — a) — A2 e
46Ae < 4aXe
b < a
In summary the deviation (a, b) is profitable for the intermediary. This estab­
lishes a contradiction to the maintained assumption. Accordingly, in equilibrium 
symmetric pricing is optimal for the intermediary.
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step 5:
Finally, the optimal choice of prices has to be determined. Given optimal
Ak
prices are symmetric a = 1 — b trading volume cv = 1 — cfc is given by cv — 
A e<lu ilikrium the monopolist’s profits are cv (a — b) = cv (2a — 1). The 
optimal choice of a can be determined as
a =  argmax cv (2a — 1)
4(1 — d) — A ^
= aIgmaX 2(2-A)" { 2 a  ~  ]
-  5 _  -
4 ~  8
Consequently
and
A ,  A 1— 1 Cfc — ~~4
This implies tha t the monopolist can earn positive revenues for any A. By 
quoting prices a < b he can earn non-positive revenues only. Therefore, the 
described allocation is an equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
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By construction, we have shown the existence of the equilibrium of result 1. 
Moreover, we have shown th a t it is the unique equilibrium candidate satisfying 
the equation system of step 3. Note th a t in the equilibrium described /tik (r) =  
Hv (s) =  1. Rationing does not occur.
The equilibrium characterized above however is not the unique | subform 
perfect Nash equilibrium of the intermediation game. For example also a no trade 
result constitutes a subform perfect Nash equilibrium, supported by the beliefs 
th a t all traders refrain from dealing with the intermediary at whatever attractive 
prices he offers. Since in this case the intermediary cannot find a matching partner 
for any single client, nobody can profit from trade with him and therefore nobody 
will trade with him, thus reinforcing the original beliefs.
Result 2
The intermediation game exhibits a continuum of subform perfect Nash equilibria.
Proof:
By the same logic as given above any price pair (a, 6) with b = 1 — a and 
a G [^,1] can be supported as a perfect Nash equilibrium.
Just let the strategy of each trader be to enter the intermediated market if 
and only if the intermediary quotes the prices (a, b) and those are advantageous 
for the particular trader as compared to the search market. Supported by the 
conjecture that everybody else is behaving the same way, it is indeed an equilib­
rium  strategy, since for deals with the intermediary at any other price he expects 
utility of zero. In this case the optimal strategy for each trader off the equilibrium 
path  is to resort to search thus reinforcing the initial conjecture.
Such an equilibrium can be described conveniently by the probabilities of 
trade which read as:
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( l  if (0 , 6) =  (5,6); 
Vr Vs : fa  (r) =  (s) =  <
t  0 otherwise.
So the monopolist has no alternative but to offer the prices (a, 6) =  (a, b). As 
the proof of result 1 reveals for most admissible prices a the intermediary can 
generate a positive volume of trade and hence positive revenues.
Q.E.D.
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b) An alternative Game Form
The multiplicity of equilibria stems from the fact tha t the participation 
decision among the various market participants is uncoordinated. As long as 
lik (r) =  fiv (s) =  1 all potential gains from trade are exhausted for any trader. 
In any other equilibrium efficiency costs arise. If the intermediary’s price quotes 
are symmetric these efficiency costs obtain from a lack of coordination. The 
source of the multiplicity is the possibility tha t buyers and sellers assign trading 
probabilities fik (r) =  /u,v (s) =  0. Since in general the monopolist has no incentive 
to quote prices, which validate such assignments, the cause of the multiplicity is 
seen to originate in the traders inability to coordinate market participation. In 
this section we shall illustrate this point by means of a slightly modified game 
form.
If agents were allowed to enter the search market after having been rationed 
at stage 3, supplying an offer to the preferred intermediary is a weakly dominant 
strategy to all traders. Thus any particular buyer or seller will enter the search 
market directly if he prefers to do so, or if according to his beliefs the preferred 
intermediary will have no business. Nevertheless since applications are costless, 
he may as well do so before search actually starts. In this section we shall discuss 
this intuition.
So consider the alternative game form f .
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Extensive form T
stage 1:
The monopolist intermediary chooses ask and bid prices (a, b) , to which he 
will be committed for the period under consideration.
stage 2:
Buyers and sellers choose the market they want to enter, if at all 
dk (r) G {0,1} U 0 and dv (s) € {0,1} U 0
0 := search market
1 := monopolist intermediary 
0 := no activity
stage 3:
Nature randomly rations the long sides of any mismatched positions of the 
intermediaries. Rationed agents will enter the search market.
stage 4:
Nature randomly matches buyers and sellers on the search market and 
determines the bidder in each match
stage 5:
Market participants as determined by the random process supply a take-it- 
or-leave-it offer.
stage 6:
Their matching partners accept or reject the offer. Acceptance completes 
the trade, whereas rejection leaves the players unsatisfied.
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The game described by this extensive form also exhibits a large variety of 
subform1 perfect Nash equilibria. However, in most of these equilibria at least 
some market participants use weakly dominated strategies. These players forego 
the chance to accept the intermediary’s offer because they conjecture tha t he 
would not be able to find a matching trading partner, even though supplying an 
unsuccessful application is costless for them  under the given constellation. In the 
previous game defined by game form T an unsuccessful application implies the 
loss of the trading possibility.
Neglecting equilibria with (weakly) dominated strategies we find a unique 
I subform perfect Nash equilibrium.
Result 3
The game T has a unique subform perfect Nash equilibrium in which no 
player uses a weakly dominated strategy. This equilibrium coincides with the equi­
librium of game form  T described in result 1.
Proof:
a) Clearly the | subform perfect Nash equilibrium of result 1 is also an equi­
librium of T. This follows from the proof of result 1 and the observation that 
sending an application to the intermediary is a weakly dominant strategy for 
buyers and sellers. In equilibrium, therefore, /tfc (r) = fiv (s) = p, =  1
b) Since accepting the monopolist’s offer is always a weakly dominant s tra t­
egy for buyers r £ Ik and sellers s € /„ they will apply. In contrast the strategy 
of not applying at all at stage 2 is weakly dominated. The monopolist, therefore, 
can expect to generate a positive volume of trade. So as long as he offers the 
equilibrium prices stated in result 1 he can implement th a t Nash equilibrium, 
which we have shown to be unique in the proof of result 1.
Q.E.D.
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Game form T clearly demonstrates the nature of the multiplicity of equilibria 
in the present set up. The indeterminacy of equilibrium derives from the problem 
of market participants to coordinate their entry decision. Intermediated trade is 
viable only if sufficiently many traders believe so and participate in intermediated 
trade.
On the other hand game form T gives market participants an advantage in 
the number of moves. If they are unsuccessful at stage 2 they simply participate 
in the search market. This destroys the simultaneity of decisions game form T a t­
tempts to capture. Therefore, in the sequel we shall prefer to concentrate on game 
form T. The purpose of this subsection is merely to highlight the coordination 
issue.
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c) Discussion and Interpretation
Interpreting result 1 and 3 we have developed a model, in which the amount 
of intermediation is endogenously determined under the presence of trade fric­
tions (search costs) on the unintermediated market. It takes time to find a good 
matching partner and as long as time is valued by the agents they may be willing 
to pay for intermediation services. Intermediaries provide immediacy and thus 
help to economize on search costs. On the other hand els long as they charge 
a positive spread they impose another transaction cost, which not all market 
participants are willing to pay. So the tradeoffs of the gains from immediacy 
against the transactional costs will determine the amount of trading activity via 
the intermediaries and the importance of the search or “shadow” market.
In equilibrium only traders with large gains from trade will prefer to trade 
with the intermediary. For them the chances to meet inadequate matching part­
ners on the search market is particularly high. Hence search may prove relatively 
more expensive for them.
But also in equilibrium there is an active search market. Since match specific 
prices may be established there, we do observe a distribution of prices, at which 
trade takes place. This is in contrast to a unique market clearing price in the 
Walrasian theory or Cournot’s monopoly theory.
The total number of active market participants in both markets exceeds the 
equilibrium number of traders in the WalrEtsian equilibrium. Clearly, in some 
matches on the search market no trade may take place. However some traders 
may engage in profitable trade, who in Walrasian theory cannot participate in 
the markets. This is illustrated in figure 1.
In the case of the monopolist the result is particularly interesting. In the 
absence of a search market (A =  0 ) a “classical” monopolist would trade with the 
same types of buyers and sellers at a higher margin however. Since the intermedi­
ary’s economic role is purely to reduce the impact of trade frictions in the market, 
in choosing prices he is therefore bound by the size of these frictions. We may
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interpret A as a partial measure of search market efficiency. An efficient search 
market, which matches the short side with certainty (i.e. A =  1 ), will restrain 
the intermediary’s choice of prices most severely. In the model under considera­
tion it will not render him totally redundant because the search market cannot 
achieve full efficiency. As the efficiency of the search market however vanishes the 
monopolist can afford to set prices, which correspond to his monopoly prices. So 
the introduction of a market, which allows agents to circumvent the monopolist 
will weaken his market power and depress his margins. This is restated in the 
following corollary.
Corollary
a( 0) =  J 6(0) =  \
« i )  =  |  k U  =  5
The parameter A can also be interpreted as a measure of the competitive 
pressure on the intermediary from a competing market. Even protected monop­
olists may have to face the competition of shadow markets, in which trade takes 
place on an unobservable individual level. Especially in financial markets such a 
dual structure of operation is found. So stocks are commonly traded on organized 
exchanges. However quite frequently there are also well established search mar­
kets, in which prices are set by bilateral agreement. Often such search markets 
themselves are organized by financial intermediaries, who thus compete with the 
organized exchanges.
Returning to Demsetz’s example at the New York Stock Exchange NYSE 
the question of competition off-market dealing is vital for the exchange, which is 
organized as a specialist system. The exchange grants exclusive rights to special­
ists to make the market in a specific stock. This gives the specialist the exclusive 
right to quote the prices for this stock. On the other hand the specialist has to 
comply with the rules of the exchange, which somewhat restrain his freedom in 
pricing and more importantly commit him to deal any normal quantity of stock 
at the price quoted. Only for large imbalances in the specialist’s books due to
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large orders this commitment may be suspended. Therefore particularly for large 
deals an “upstairs dealer market” has developed, in which large trades, typically 
block trades, are matched. The participants in this upstairs market are a few 
large intermediary houses, which due to their large customer base can accom­
modate large deals better than the exchange. Obviously as the efficiency of the 
upstairs market increases and small transactions are collected and bundled into 
larger blocks, there is concern about the viability of the specialist exchange.
Finally note tha t we cannot Pareto rank the equilibria for alternative mea­
sures of search market efficiency. Increasing A will reduce equilibrium spreads and 
the participation in the search market as is seen in figure 1. Increasing efficiency 
of search may leave out market participants with rather low gains from trade.
Pagano (1986) also cites the Italian stock market as an extreme example 
of the dual market structure. According to him about J  of the trade in Italian 
stocks takes place off the exchanges. His explanation of this phenomenon however 
employs a quite different argument. In an environment of aggregate price risk he 
argues tha t search markets are deeper and hence more liquid. Especially for large 
transactions the price risks associated with the organized market are larger. A 
search fee, which could be thought of as a brokerage fee to acquire access to the 
upstairs market, prevents all traders from concentrating on the search market 
and particularly traders with small transaction volumes will concentrate on the 
official stock exchanges. Thus he assumes tha t organized exchanges costlessly 
provide the price setting mechanism. In contrast, our model tries to explain 
the emergence of prices on organized markets. Therefore, the price mechanism is 
costly and traders will trade with the intermediary only, if the search costs exceed 
the bid ask spread. Otherwise the traders with low gain from trade will resort 
to less costly search. Search in our context means direct search of the market 
participants, whereas the upstairs market can be thought of constituting already 
some kind of organized and possibly efficient search.
In establishing fragmentation as an equilibrium phenomenon, Pagano strong­
ly relies on the multiplicity of “conjectural” equilibria. Of course, full concentra­
tion of trade on the organized exchange provides another equilibrium of his model.
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So there is a similarity to our model concerning the coordination issue. Result 2  
emphasizes the sensitivity of intermediated markets with respect to beliefs about 
potential market participation. In order for intermediation to be viable market 
participants have to believe in its value and such a conviction implies some degree 
of coordination of the entry decisions. Otherwise chances of profitable interme­
diation may be foregone.
One could argue that the no trade phenomenon and the many conjectural 
equilibria sustained by appropriate beliefs in result 2  would never really happen 
in the game under consideration, since at given prices (a, 6) the agents with valu­
ations from Ik and I v should simply choose intermediated transactions. Thus,in 
the subgame of stage 2 , they could enforce Nash equilibria with higher payoffs for 
all agents from Ik and Iv. These equilibria are not payoff dominant for all traders 
however, since the expected quality of matches will decrease for the participants 
in the search market. Nevertheless the coordination required among the traders 
in I v and Ih to play the game with a positive level of intermediation seems to be 
minimal.
On the other side in a more complex and realistic environment with several 
related markets, which give rise to profitable intermediation, such a simple selec­
tion argument would probably fail and the coordination issue would become far 
more serious.
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4. Price Com petition among Intermediaries:
a) Characterization of Equilibria
Introducing another intermediary allows us to discuss the aspects of competition 
among intermediaries. We shall see that we can concentrate on the case of just 
two intermediaries. So, now traders will have the choice of dealing either with 
one of the two intermediaries or to engage in active search themselves.
As the participation decisions of the traders are concerned, the same phe­
nomena as in the monopolist case arise. This implies that intermediation may 
not occur even though several intermediaries are in the market offering attrac­
tive prices. Again the pure attraction of prices is irrelevant, if the intermediaries 
cannot transact at those prices. This again will support consistent beliefs about 
the intermediaries’ inability of generating enough trading volume.
An additional phenomenon will occur now, since traders beliefs may dis­
criminate among the intermediaries, thus impairing effective competition among 
them. So for example if the general belief is upheld that intermediary 1 alone can 
generate enough volume to render his services profitable, this fortunate inter­
mediary will enjoy a monopoly position. Competition will not be effective, since 
it is counteracted by the traders’ psychology, which in this example does not 
give competitors any chance. This example already indicates tha t competition 
among intermediaries very sensitively depends on the general belief structure in 
the economy. This is summarized in the next result.
Result 4
The intermediation game V with competing intermediaries I  > 2  exhibits a con­
tinuum of\subform perfect Nash equilibria.
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Proof:
By the argument given above any price quote of any intermediary can be 
supported as a| subform perfect Nash equilibrium. If traders simply collectively 
refute to deal with any intermediary, other than i, none of the competitors will 
engage in business. Now result 2  can be applied for intermediary i.
Q.E.D.
All of these equilibria, except the one we are going to describe below, are 
sustained by particular belief structures, which rely on the fact tha t profitable 
trading opportunities are foregone because of a coordination problem among 
exactly those agents, who could profit. In other words at stage 2  in the game tree 
subsets of traders cannot agree to play the equilibrium, which yields the higher 
payoff for the entire subsets. The inability to coordinate the participation decision 
creates the anticompetitive character of these equilibria. Since we do not model 
the emergence of belief structures we cannot discriminate among them. However 
we can analyze the particular case of a “competitive climate” , in which traders 
exploit any profitable opportunity in the mutual understanding that everybody 
else behaves the same way. In this case the intermediaries are exposed to the full 
force of competition.
In order to formalize this notion define the set of buyers Ik (p) and sellers 
(p), who prefer to trade with intermediary * =  1 , 2  at the given set of prices p =  
((<Zi,&i), (a2 , 62)), provided the intermediary generates positive trading volume. 
If at stage 2 , after the intermediaries’ choice of prices, both of these sets for 
intermediary i are not empty, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria of 
the subsequent subgame. In one equilibrium agents I %k (p) and (p) actually do 
trade with intermediary i, whereas in the remaining one agents from both sets do 
not trade with him. The latter case is payoff inferior for these agents. We can now 
analyze the set of equilibria, which is supported by the selection of the dominant 
equilibria for players in non empty sets Ik (p) and /* (p). Note tha t typically these 
equilibria are not payoff dominant in the sense of Harsanyi, Selten (1989), since
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the quality of the search market is impaired as high valuation traders leave the 
market.
The dominant equilibria in this sense do not allow any pair of buyers and 
sellers to improve their equilibrium payoffs if they were allowed to coordinate 
their participation decision. So in this sense all potential gains from trade are 
exploited in such an equilibrium.
Result 5:
There is a payoff unique\subform perfect Nash equilibrium for the game form  T, 
in which no pair of buyers and sellers could improve by bilateral coordination of 
the participation decision.
Furthermore, this equilibrium corresponds to the competitive equilibrium outcome,
A
with the intermediaries choosing the Walrasian price a, = b, = ^ , for i =  1 , 2 . 
In this equilibrium the amount of search activity and the volume of intermediated 
trade is indeterminate.
Proof:
Suppose intermediary 1 offers uniformly better spreads, i.e. a2 > aL > bL > b2. 
Then under the chosen selection criterion intermediary 2 will not be able to 
generate any positive level of activity, since any potential customer is better off 
dealing with his competitor 1 . The volume of trade of intermediary 1 corresponds 
to the volume a monopolist could achieve at the same price quote and is therefore 
determined as in step 3 of the proof of result 2.
Therefore in any relevant equilibrium the profits of the intermediaries have 
to be equal, i.e. nL =  7r2. Otherwise, if 7r2 > intermediary 1 can undercut
A
his competitor by choosing prices aL =  a2 — e and 6 A =  b2 +  e ,where e is small 
enough, such that 7r2 > ?Ti > tt2. The existence of such an e follows from the 
continuity of the volume of trade in prices (see step 3 in the proof of result 2).
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If however profits are equal, they must be equally zero for any relevant 
equilibrium, because otherwise by the same argument a slight reduction in the 
spread causes a discontinuous increase in profits for any deviant. So necessarily 
the equilibrium spread is zero and it remains to show th a t the unique equilibrium 
price implied by this class of equilibria is the Walrasian price indeed.
A
Assume a2 = b2 = P2 > i -  W hat allocation would this price imply in the 
absence of intermediary 1 and what would his optimal response therefore be?
Suppose there was an active search market, then clearly intermediary 1 could 
take advantage of it by offering prices, which are good enough to a ttract cus­
tomers from both sides of the market, in close similarity to the monopoly case. 
Most importantly an active search market would give him an opportunity to 
earn positive profits, given his competitor’s prices. This contradicts our finding 
however that in any relevant equilibrium profits are zero.
Alternatively, if there was no active search market, sellers will be rationed 
with a v =  since all sellers with s < p and all buyers r > p will trade with 
intermediary 2 . By lowering his ask price dx =  p — e, intermediary 1 can attract 
at least the buyers with reservation values in [p — e,p]. Now intermediary 1 can 
afford to offer a positive spread, i.e. 6 X =  aL — e, e > 0  (but small enough). Faced 
with the choice of price p with probability and price p — e with probability 
1 , sellers with reservation values close enough to zero will prefer to trade with 
intermediary 1 . Thus again he could earn positive profits in contradiction to our 
earlier finding.
Finally the allocation, in which both intermediaries quote Walrasian ask and
bid prices is a subform perfect Nash equilibrium, when trading volumes of all
intermediaries are equal for example.
Q.E.D.
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b) Discussion and Interpretation
Result 5 reconfirms the sensitivity of intermediated markets with respect to 
widely held beliefs and participation decisions of potential clients. In addition 
to the monopoly case, also the degree of competition among intermediaries may 
be affected by the general belief structure.
In a “competitive environment” , however, Bertrand like undercutting is ef­
fective. In this sense we have provided a model explaining the emergence of equi­
librium prices without resorting to the coordinating function of an auctioneer, 
but exclusively relying on the rational choice of prices by the market participants.
This is in contrast to recent work on intermediation. Stahl (1988) and Yanelle 
(1988) offer models of two sided price competition, in which non-Walrasian equi­
libria emerge. In their models there is no active search market, which corresponds 
to A =  0  in our model. Hence the only way buyers and sellers can transact is 
via the intermediaries. Both authors rely on a sequential notion of intermedia­
tion. Intermediaries have to buy the products first, before they can resell them 
again. Short sales are not allowed. An intermediary succeeding in purchasing all 
the products by offering the most attractive bid price can afford to set revenue 
maximizing ask prices, which in general will exceed the Walrasian equilibrium 
price.
With an active search market (A >  0 ) such a phenomenon could not occur. 
The reason is that intermediaries also face competition from the search market. 
Therefore they cannot maintain both, a monopoly position in both markets and a
A
positive spread. Whenever their equilibrium spread were positive, > 6t , buyers 
and sellers from [&,•,«*] would resort to the search market. This would create 
an opportunity for competitors to earn positive profits. In equilibrium however
A
profits have to be zero and thus at =  6*.
Our model predicts the Walrasian price also for the extreme case of A =  0. 
This is a consequence of the particular rationing scheme we employ. Matching 
the short side of the market implies that intermediary t ’s total volume of trade is
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bounded by m in{l —a , , 6t }. Therefore sellers will typically be rationed for 6 , >
In contrast the model sketched above requires that any bid b is a firm price, at 
which intermediary i will purchase any quantity supplied. Thus he obtains the 
monopoly position which allows him to sell the products at a positive margin 
hi > bi . So the latter rationing rule explicitly introduces an asymmetry in favour 
of the sellers, which causes the non-Walrasian result.
Note that our argument for the general case A > 0  is independent of the 
particular rationing scheme employed. It is therefore the existence of a parallel 
market, which substantially alters the nature of price competition. In particular 
it prevents the occurrence of non-Walrasian equilibria. So equilibria of the model 
of two sided price competition resemble those of one sided price competition as 
in the classical Bertrand game, essentially because the search market helps to 
preserve symmetry.
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5. Conclusion
Costs of intermediation have not been mentioned so far in our model. Implicitly 
we have assumed that only intermediaries did have free access to an information 
technology, which intermediaries could use to inform each trader instantaneously 
about their price quotes. Clearly, if each trader has free access to such a tech­
nology efficient search will result and nothing remains to be explained. We shall 
now allow equal access to such a technology for each trader, however at a price.
Assume that the information technology is generally available at a common 
fixed cost A, payable at stage 0  before the intermediation game starts.
Again multiple equilibria due to coordination issues arise. In a “competitive 
environment” , defined as in result 4, however just a single intermediary will be 
active because only a single intermediary can earn positive revenues in the ensuing 
price game. So the monopolistic equilibrium of result 1 is the unique equilibrium 
of the entry game. This is an artifact of the Bertrand nature of competition in the 
intermediation game. As soon as two intermediaries are active they drive down 
each other’s equilibrium profits to zero, which does not allow to recover the sunk 
cost paid for access to the information technology at stage 0 .
This argument is valid for any positive level of costs k > 0 . So the market 
we describe is a natural monopoly in the sense of Shaked and Sutton (1983). As 
long as costs are positive only one intermediary can “survive” in the market. He 
will provide the service of immediacy at a positive spread. However in choosing 
the spread he is bound by the degree of efficiency of the search market A. So 
Demsetz’s intuition about the beneficial effects of competition across markets 
carries over to our model. However in contrast to his view there is no reason to 
expect full efficiency, as long as rival markets are not frictionless. In our model 
the spread actually is bounded from below (see corollary). So the bid ask spread 
is a biased measure of the real costs of transacting.
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"The way to make money is to get, if you can, a monopoly for  
yourself "
(Aristoteles, 384-322 B.C., The Politics)
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Natural Oligopoly in Intermediated M arkets
1. Introduction
It is a characteristic feature of intermediated markets th a t the economic bene­
fits derived from intermediary services can be fully exploited only, when those 
services are offered by few firms. In the literature the function of intermediaries 
is generally associated with the presence of some sort of economies of scale 1 or 
the specialization of intermediaries in reducing transaction costs like search costs 
for example 2 . In either case a single intermediary would minimize the costs 
of the intermediary activity. On the other hand a monopolist intermediary has 
strong incentives to exert his market power thus preventing an overall efficient 
allocation. Consequently, the intermediation industry exhibits an innate conflict 
between cost efficiency and competitiveness.
It is not surprising, therefore, tha t much of the discussion about the optimal 
industrial structure for intermediation services centers around the regulation of 
monopoly 3 . If one views intermediated markets as natural monopolies one might 
like to curb the market power of the monopolists by regulatory action. The New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) provides an example of a market, where the market 
making activities for a particular stock are delegated to single specialists subject 
to the rules of the exchange. In addition, as argued by Demsetz (1968) and 
shown in the preceding chapter, the monopolist’s conduct is restrained by the 
competition from the search market and other exchanges.
The view of intermediated markets as natural monopolies, however, has to 
be contrasted against the strategic analysis of intermediation by Yanelle (1988)
1 see Diamond (1984) and Yanelle (1988) for example
2 see chapter 2
3 as an early example see Demsetz (1968)
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and the results of the preceding chapter. In both studies in general there is no 
unique equilibrium outcome. While monopoly in both cases is compatible with 
equilibrium also equilibria with several active intermediaries are possible. Due to 
coordination problems intrinsic to intermediated markets in both cases a multi­
plicity of equilibria is sustainable. In general an intermediary can be active in the 
market only, when he expects a positive transaction volume. If traders perceive 
that a particular intermediary might not be able to find a matching trade or that 
he incurs relatively high risks of bankruptcy they may be unwilling to engage 
in business with him at any price offer. Based on such perceptions price com­
petition among intermediaries will be impaired and a variety of equilibria with 
several active intermediaries can be sustained. Nevertheless, as in the previous 
chapter, additional refinement concepts may single out the natural monopoly as 
a unique industrial structure.
Except for regulatory reasons, few intermediated markets are truly monopo­
listic. Many intermediated markets may seem concentrated with few dominant 
firms of roughly equal size. Large block transactions in American stocks, for 
example, are typically not traded at the floor of the NYSE. Instead they are 
brokered in the so-called “upstairs market” by few investment banks like Me- 
rill Lynch, Goldman Sachs or Salomon Brothers. These investment houses rely 
on their network of contacts to institutional clients in order to manage directly 
block transactions, which because of their size could easily exceed any specialist’s 
capacity to absorb risks.
Also the banking structure in many European countries is characterized 
by few dominant banks and a wide class of small banks. So in Germany and 
Switzerland, for example, three banks of similar size dominate the industry. These 
dominant banks also appear to possess the largest networks of branches and 
foreign affiliations. Since the banking industry probably belongs to the most 
heavily regulated industries care has to be taken with such observations, however. 
Nevertheless, regulatory action seems to be more concerned about entry into the 
industry than about non-fraudulent exit.
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The purpose of the present chapter is to present a model of oligopolistic 
competition among intermediaries.
As in chapter 2  we take the view that intermediaries help to reduce tra­
ding frictions. By publicly quoting prices they inform the market about trading 
opportunities. In contrast to the previous chapter, however, we allow interme­
diaries to decide about the scale of their advertising activities. By setting up a 
large information network intermediaries can quote prices to a large potential 
clientele. Smaller networks result in less market participants being aware about 
the smaller intermediary.
If all intermediaries choose to inform the full market all potential clients are 
fully informed and consequently will deal at the best price quotes available. In this 
case price competition drives spreads down to zero and no intermediary can earn 
positive revenues necessary to recoup the fixed costs for setting up the information 
network. This is the case of the preceding chapter, where intermediaries have 
access to a single information technology only, which informs the whole market. 
If on the other hand each intermediary specializes on a different market segment 
each of them can exploit a local monopoly position, since the potential clients 
are informed of at most one price quote.
In general, however, intermediaries compete for each other’s market shares 
and consequently the potential clienteles of various intermediaries will overlap. So 
there are market participants who receive price offers of various intermediaries. 
Which offer should they accept? Since intermediaries might not be able to find a 
matching trading partner and hence trade at the prices quoted, market partici­
pants have to weight the price on offer against the probability of trade actually 
taking place. Consequently, they might not choose to trade at the cheapest price 
if tha t deal seems highly risky 4 . A trader facing identical quotes of intermedia­
ries with information networks of different size will prefer to deal with the larger 
intermediary because of a higher probability of trade. The larger intermediary in
4 In Yanelle (1988) the multiplicity of equilibria is sustained by a similar con­
sideration. In her model the probability of trade derives from the participation 
decision of the market participants and not from a deliberate strategic choice
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the perception of the customers offers “better” liquidity services. He provides the 
service of immediate exchange at the prices quoted at a higher probability than 
rivals with smaller outlays. Accordingly, the services on offer exhibit the feature 
of vertically differentiated products 5 .
Markets of vertically differentiated products exhibit an innate tendency to­
wards natural oligopolies. The concept of a natural oligopoly was introduced by 
Shaked and Sutton (1983) and refers to markets, in which for any market size 
the number of active firms is limited by an upper bound, which is independent 
of the size of the economy (or the market). Natural oligopolies describe concen­
trated markets, in which no convergence to a fragmented structure obtains as 
the economy grows large.
The bound on active firms decisively depends on the structure of preferen­
ces and income distributions. Natural oligopolies occur in differentiated product 
markets, where all consumers unanimously agree on the ranking of the various 
products priced at marginal costs. Price competition among the higher ranked 
products tends to reduce prices so far that only a small number of firms may 
be able to earn revenues in excess of their costs of entry. Moreover, competition 
among high quality products depresses prices such tha t certain lower quality 
products may seem unattractive to customers even if offered at marginal cost 
prices. In this case even the poorest consumer may purchase products of relatively 
high quality. Thus low quality products may never gain positive market shares. 
Consequently, only few high quality products can remain in the market.
If there are different rankings across customers, in close analogy to markets 
with horizontally differentiated products, necessarily a fragmented structure rer 
suits 6 .W ith  horizontally differentiated products there is always room between 
two rivals for another competitor to enter. The entrant by charging low enough 
prices can always attract sufficient customers to earn positive revenues. So as 
the economy grows he can cover his fixed expenses. This mechanism allows to 
introduce an unbounded number of firms into the market. Hence, the element of
6 Shaked, Sutton, 1982
6 see Shaked, Sutton, 1983
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vertical product differentiation is central to the notion of a natural oligopoly.
As a standard example of a market, which may be described as a natural 
oligopoly one could think of a technological product market such as the market 
for personal computers. In this case the processing time may be viewed as the 
vertical quality characteristic. If the technology is such tha t product improvement 
only adds in “small” amounts to fixed costs competing firms in the market will 
try  to differentiate themselves from their rivals in order to escape the competitive 
forces of price competition. Different firms offer different qualities and it can be 
shown th a t price competition limits the number of firms which can earn positive 
revenues and thus recover fixed cost outlays (Shaked, Sutton,1982).7
In this vein we argue that services offered by intermediaries also exhibit 
an important quality element, which may support a natural oligopoly as the 
natural industrial structure. In particular, we analyze a brokerage market, in 
which intermediaries can select the size of their potential clientele.
7 If the only difference between computers were their colour and preferences 
were uniformly distributed along the spectrum arbitrarily many firms could op­
erate in large markets, each offering products of the same quality in different 
colours, however.
2. Outline of the Argument
We choose a model in which market participants are assumed to be scattered 
on various isolated islands, which, for example, may be thought of as different 
stock exchanges8 . Agents on different islands can communicate only via commu­
nication channels such as telephone lines. To set up an information link is costly. 
Therefore, only intermediaries will choose to operate various channels which they 
connect to communication networks. At the investment stage they decide, which 
islands to include in their information network. Once such a network is estab­
lished they can quote prices on each island included. Also they receive all the 
local information of islands in their network. Consequently, intermediaries with 
larger networks can address more islands and clients. This in particular allows 
them to search more efficiently for trading partners.
The market we consider is a brokerage market in which intermediaries do 
not actually take possession of the good to be traded. They merely provide the 
service of searching for a trading partner and are compensated by a commission 
fee only in case of success.
The trading opportunities arise over time. We may view them  as “liquidity 
events” , which occur at times and levels of urgency, which are unforeseen by the 
individual traders. Each liquidity event is characterized by the fact that there are 
only few sellers and buyers in the market who would like to exchange a commodity 
or a block of securities. The traders problem is th a t they do not know about the 
identity of their trading partners. Building up a communication network for a 
single trading event could be quite expensive. So they may prefer to delegate the 
search to intermediaries rather than search for their own. In order to simplify 
the exposition we abstract from the possibility of private search. Since the choice 
between direct search and delegated search has been analyzed in detail already 
in the previous chapter we can concentrate on the choice of market participants 
among the various intermediaries here.
8 Some German stocks are traded on eight national exchanges and on some 
international exchanges, for example.
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Competition among intermediaries is modelled as a two stage game. Initially, 
at stage one, intermediaries decide about their long run strategic variable in 
designing their information network. At stage two, in the short run, they compete 
in prices and offer commission charges.
The success of an intermediaries’ search obviously depends on the size of 
his network. The larger the clientele the higher is the probability of generating a 
trade. If the cost for setting up the information system is largely sunk, there is 
limited entry into the industry with competitors choosing different information 
networks. Since intermediaries with identical networks cannot earn positive re­
venues they try  to differentiate themselves from their rivals by choosing different 
networks. This strategy may not always be available. It fails in particular when 
one intermediary serves all islands. Nevertheless, in this case competitors can 
select a smaller and less expensive network. In order to attract customers they 
have to demand cheaper prices than their larger rivals as in contrast to the glo­
bally active intermediary they cannot guarantee to find a matching partner with 
certainty. If market participants valuation of the deal is high they will prefer to 
deal with the less risky intermediary even at the expense of a higher commission 
charge. Otherwise, they may prefer the cheaper offer at the risk of not concluding 
a trade at all.
The probability of trading introduces an element of vertical product dif­
ferentiation. Customers prefer to trade with intermediaries whose probability of 
trading is high and may pay a premium for better chances. Intermediaries typ­
ically try to differentiate themselves from competitors by establishing different 
information networks which affect their trading probabilities. This allows them 
to relax price competition.
Arguments familiar from the literature on vertical product differentiation 
help to characterize the market as a natural oligopoly. As in Shaked and Sutton 
(1982) it can be shown tha t in equilibrium different intermediaries will enjoy 
different market shares. Moreover, we demonstrate the validity of another version 
of the finiteness property (Shaked, Sutton, 1983) in our model. In particular, we 
shall find tha t as the economy grows large exactly three intermediaries will gene­
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rate positive transaction volume on almost all islands. The largest intermediary 
covers all islands, while his closest rivals are active on exactly one island less. 
Since the closest rivals are of equal size competition among them drives their 
commission charges to the competitive level on all islands, on which both are 
active. Consequently, each of them has exactly one niche island, which allows 
him to earn positive revenues. The niche islands give room for a competitive 
fringe of many small intermediaries all trying to participate in the rents available 
on those particular markets. Thus the natural industrial structure in our model 
is that of three large and globally active intermediaries and a competitive fringe 
of small intermediaries competing in small niche markets.
Although, our model predicts a fairly concentrated industrial structure, as 
the number of islands increases the differences in size among the top three firms 
vanishes and price margins tend to their competitive values. In this sense in our 
brokerage market concentration ratios are not informative about the competi­
tiveness of the industry.
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3. The M odel
Islands
Let us consider the market for a perishable homogeneous product. Three types 
of market participants will be active in this market, buyers, sellers and interme­
diaries.
Moreover, let the market be subdivided into M  isolated and structurally 
identical islands m G  {1 ,...,M } . Traders cannot move across islands and the 
only links between the islands are communication channels such as telephone 
lines. These channels between islands can be connected to larger or even global 
communication networks. Since access to these communication channels, how­
ever, is costly only few agents will actually use them.
We prefer to think of these islands as independent geographically separated 
markets with a large number of economic agents active on each island. In an 
extreme case one could also view these islands as the basic economic agents 
themselves. 9
Liquidity Events
The desire for urgent trade is originated by liquidity events, which do occur 
sequentially over time and are unpredictable by market participants. In order to 
keep the model manageable we employ a highly stylized version of those events. 
Each liquidity event consists of two components: on some island, due to liquidity 
considerations, one particular client suddenly would like to sell a block of stock, 
for example, and on another island another client would like to buy the same 
amount of the same stock. Aggregate excess demand across all islands remains 
constant and the equilibrium price of the security should not be affected. Both
9 Such an interpretation is particularly relevant to describe the market for 
large block transactions in securities among large institutional investors.
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traders attach symmetric valuations to the particular trade, in the sense that 
their reservation prices add up to one. When a buyer’s urgency to purchase is 
given by a valuation of r the corresponding seller’s valuation is assumed to be 
1 — r. Also the valuations across liquidity events may differ. Hence, a buyer’s 
valuation of a purchase at price p is r  — p, while a seller’s valuation of a sale at 
the same price is ( 1  — r) — p. Furthermore, we assume that the reservation value 
r is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval r G [5-, 1].
The trading opportunity is short term and does exist only for tha t period. In 
order to exploit the potential gains from trade buyer and seller have to transact 
in the same period correspondingly. We take the view tha t over time there is a 
succession of many independent liquidity events with the same structure. Since, 
however, any transactions have to be completed within one period, we can omit 
the subscripts for time. Rather we introduce a scale param eter A  G IR >0- It 
serves as a measure for the total number of transactions and hence as a measure 
of the size of the whole market.
Liquidity events are uniformly distributed across islands and across economic 
agents on each island. For each island m  we can define an expected demand 
function D(p, m)  and an expected supply function S(p, m)  as:
S(p, m) = A p
D ( p , m ) =  A ( l - p )  ,
where p G [0, i ]  and A  G IR> o
The market participants’ problem is to find the suitable trading partner in 
the same period. Knowing the structure of the game they know about his exis­
tence and about his reservation value. However, in order to conclude a transaction 
in addition they need to know his identity and location. In principle, they could 
search by randomly calling various telephone numbers. However, this is unlikely 
to be a cheap strategy and it might be preferable for them to contact a broker 
who professionally maintains an information and communication network, which
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allows him readily to evaluate the various needs of his clientele. Since in the pre­
vious chapter we have already discussed the endogenous choice between private 
search and intermediated search we concentrate on delegated search here. So, 
having incurred a liquidity event market participants are only allowed to contact 
an intermediary active on their own island. The possibility of private search will 
not be considered in this chapter.
In order to emphasize the brokerage function of intermediaries we decompose 
the liquidity event into two subperiods with either the buying event or the selling 
event occurring in the first subperiod and the offsetting counterevent happening 
in the second subperiod. W ithout loss of generality we may assume tha t the desire 
to purchase occurs first in the first subperiod. Because of the decomposition of 
the time period buyers can contact intermediaries in the first subperiod to search 
for the trading partner in the second subperiod.
Intermediaries
Intermediaries offer the service of searching for a trading partner.
Specifically, they offer contracts, which specify a commission fee P{ (m) for 
successful search. Intermediaries can communicate their price offers to potential 
traders in island m  only by means of an information technology. We could think of 
this information technology as a computer network, which informs clients about 
the intermediaries’ current price quotes instantaneously. Such technologies are 
provided for example by Reuters or Datastream  in the foreign exchange or in 
bond and stock markets. Access to this information technology requires a fixed 
payment of k > 0  per island.
The local communication networks can be connected to larger information 
networks. Any agent with access to such an information network may engage 
in intermediary activities. Since the market size, as measured by A, is limited 
and k > 0  only finitely many agents can profitably purchase access to those 
information media. W ithout loss of generality we can restrict the set of potential
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intermediaries10 i to a countable set, i.e. i G IN.
Each intermediary i selects a set of islands C { 1  , ...,M }, on which he 
plans to offer his brokerage services. For an application to islands a cost 
of k # M i  has to be borne. By means of his information network an intermediary 
can advertise his commission fees Pi (m) on each island included in the network 
m  £ M i. He may choose to quote different prices across islands.
The access decision has to be undertaken before any liquidity event takes 
place and before prices can be quoted. Implicitly, we assume tha t by choosing 
Mi the intermediaries define their long run positions. The process of installation 
and granting access permission to the information network is lengthy relative to 
the urgency of trade. However, liquidity events may occur quite frequently and 
in principle intermediaries could change prices after each transaction. We view 
the investment decision as the long run strategic decision, while prices are taken 
as short run strategic variables readily to be adjusted to changes in the market 
environment if necessary.
Once a client applies the intermediary attem pts to find the counterpart by 
searching in his potential clientele. If he is successful the two traders are matched 
and the intermediary earns the advertised commission fee. If the search, however, 
remains unsuccessful no trade can take place and the trading opportunity is lost. 
No further obligations for the intermediary do arise. The only commitment he 
undertakes is to fix the price quote for the period under consideration. This 
excludes the possibility of renegotiation after successful search.
The process of search should be viewed as “direct search” in the sense tha t 
intermediaries directly contact their potential customers and inform them  about 
the possibility of a trading opportunity without disclosing the identity of their 
client before concluding the match. Intermediaries can only search on islands 
included in their network. Implicitly we assume tha t successful search requires
10 In the model set out below any agent having purchased the information 
technology has a strict incentive to engage in the intermediation business. In 
particular, there is no risk of bankruptcy.
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some “intimate” knowledge of the local market, which can be acquired only when 
being present on the local market.
Furthermore we assume an efficient search mechanism. So whenever the trad­
ing partner wanted happens to live on one of the islands m E M, we assume 
intermediary i will find him with certainty. Thus intermediary t ’s probability of 
concluding a trade is given by .
In the first subperiod market participants observing the range of prices of 
the intermediaries active on their island select an intermediary to search for the 
matching partner in the second subperiod. If the matching partner happens to be 
on an island served by the chosen intermediary he will be aware of the interme­
diary’s search and apply. Accordingly, the match takes place. The intermediary is 
rewarded his commission fee and the matching partners bargain about the terms 
of trade. We assume that they select the Nash bargaining solution and split the 
surplus after deduction of the commission fee. This implies th a t they also split 
the brokerage fee P,(m ). Hence, each trader pays Pi(m) = JPi(m ) . If no match 
is generated the trading opportunity is lost.
Market participants have the choice between several intermediaries. Prices 
are not absolutely certain since they depend on the intermediary’s ability to 
m atch both sides. A given buyer before selecting an intermediary has to consider 
the probability that the intermediary might also attract the seller in order to 
conclude the deal. We assume that market participants are informed about the 
identity and in particular about the network Af, of each intermediary active on 
their island. They do not observe their price quotes on other islands however. For 
a buyer r residing on island m  the expected utility from trading with intermediary 
i is determined as the product of the probability of trade &£-*■ and the surplus 
the trader can achieve from trade with intermediary i at the price Pi (m) given the 
expected outcome of negotiations with his trading partner. It reads Wi(r,m) = 
^ ^ - ( r  — Pi (m ))- Since the buyer cannot travel across islands he cannot take 
advantage of possibly better prices at another island.
Finally, buyer r on island m  selects the value maximizing offer d(r, m). Using 
the convention W0 (r, m) =  0 and interpreting i =  0 as “no trade” we can write
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d(r,m ) := argmax i ^Wi {r,m)}
In case of indifference between several intermediaries he chooses randomly 
between those alternatives.
Note th a t all market participants agree on the choice among the various 
intermediaries, if all price quotes are identical and the ^r-*- can be ranked in a 
strict order. All agents prefer to trade with the intermediary offering the highest 
probability of trade. Thus, the intermediaries’ services of immediate exchange 
exhibit the feature of vertically differentiated products as defined by Shaked and 
Sutton (1982). Intermediaries with larger networks offer a higher probability of 
trade and consequently a better product. Thus, they gain market power and may 
command higher prices than their less reliable rivals.
Intermediaries’ expected revenues consist of the sum of expected revenues 
on each island R^ = ^2meM Ri (ra). Those again can be calculated as the product 
of market size A, the expected trading volume per period on island m  and
the price advertised, Ri(m) =  Agt (m)P<(m )- By &(m) an  ^ Ri(m) we mean 
explicitly the expected volume of trade and the revenue intermediary i expects 
to originate on island m. So in our framework it refers to the number of buyers, 
intermediary i expects to attract on island m.
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Game Form
By way of summarizing we set out the extensive form of this game: 
stage 1 :
Intermediaries i G IN  establish a network Mi of islands 
Mi C { 1 ,...,M }
stage 2 .1 .t:
Intermediaries choose prices (m ), i G M { , to which they will be 
committed for the period under consideration.
stage 2 .2 .t:
Nature selects a realization of the liquidity event 
(r,m ) €  [ J ,l]  x { 1
stage 2.3.t
Buyer r  chooses the intermediary to whom he delegates 
the search d(r, m) G {t | m 6  Mi } U { 0 }
0  := no trade
1 := intermediary
stage 2.4.t:
At this stage no strategic action takes place. The second subperiod is 
realized. If the seller is in reach of the network of intermediary d(r, m) 
trade is concluded. Intermediary d(r, m) is paid the commission fee 
Pd{r,to) and the traders split the remaining surplus to get .
Otherwise no trade takes place and each participant receives a zero 
payoff.
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The index t =  1 , A  denotes the succession of independent liquidity events. 
Since we concentrate on stationarity and serial independence of the trading events 
it suffices to analyze one single such event. The scale param eter A  is simply the 
number of liquidity events.
Furthermore, observe that no external uncertainty enters the model. The 
only uncertainty is endogenous and derives from the limited knowledge of indi­
vidual traders about their trading partners. Intermediaries do not possess any 
particular advantage in knowledge. However, they may invest in superior com­
munication technologies.
We are interested in the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game.
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4. Price Com petition
In our model intermediaries undertake two strategic decisions. Initially, they 
decide about the scale of their operations and establish a communication network 
across the islands they plan to engage in business on. Having established their 
presence in the market they compete for market shares by quoting prices. To 
solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria we solve the game backwards. In 
this section we focus on the last subgame and analyze the nature of short run 
competition in prices for given investment decisions. Long run competition and 
the choice of the network is the topic of the next section.
Note that at a given price market participants prefer to deal with the inter­
mediary who enjoys the higher probability of trade. In equilibrium intermedia­
ries with smaller networks have to compensate a lower likelihood of concluding 
a successful trade by offering more attractive prices. Accordingly, in equilibrium 
M j C Mi implies P3 (m) <  Pt (m) for m  £ M i .
Competition on say island m between two intermediaries i and j  with net­
works of identical size, # Mi =  # M 3, drives their spreads down to zero and the 
classical Bertrand type result obtains on island m for all intermediaries with 
networks of the same or smaller sizes. From the viewpoint of the market par­
ticipants intermediaries i and j  are identical competitors. In this situation they 
strictly prefer the cheaper offer. Hence, each intermediary has an incentive to 
undercut any positive price offer of his rival and the competitive allocation with 
zero spreads obtains. We summarize these observations in the first result.
R e su lt 1  
In equilibrium
M j C Mi implies (m) >  P, (m ) , m € M j and R { (m) > Rj (m)
M j =  Mi implies Pi(m) = Pj (m) =  0 , m  £  M { =  M j and Ri(m ) = R j (m) =  0 .
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Proof:
Since intermediary i enjoys a wider network he can always imitate j ’s choice 
of prices and drive him out of business, as i ’s trading probability is higher than 
j ’s. Consequently, j 1 s prices and revenues in equilibrium do not exceed those of 
i. When both possess the same network of islands Bertrand price competition 
drives the spreads down to zero in each submarket m.
Q.E.D.
The result implies that in equilibrium at most finitely many intermediaries 
can earn positive prices on each island because the number of islands is finite.
Before establishing the existence of equilibrium in prices we have to study 
the choice of intermediary by the market participants (here: buyers). Consider 
island m  and relabel intermediaries active on island m  such tha t they are ranked 
in decreasing size j fM i  >  # M 2 >  > # M  > 1 . For the moment we allow I
different intermediaries to trade on island m. Observe tha t the individual value 
functions W ,(r,m ) =  ^ p - ( r  — \  — Pi(m)) , i 6  { j  | m  €  My} are linear in r. 
Hence, following Shaked and Sutton (1983) we can define critical buyers ti(m ) 
who are just indifferent between intermediary i and i +  1 . Buyers with larger 
valuations r — J- > £, (m) prefer trade with the larger intermediary and buyers 
with lower valuations will trade with the smaller intermediary. In accordance 
with result 1 in equilibrium the solution obviously requires P<(m) >
Buyers with valuations less than Pi(m) cannot gain from intermediated trade. 
Since we do not allow them to engage in private search they remain inactive.
The critical buyers are defined as the solution to the system of indifference 
relations at given price quotes:
Wt (^(m ),m ) =  Wi+1(ti(m ),m )  , i < l
W,(ft (m ),m ) =  pi
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By employing the definition for W{ (r, m) this equation system can be rewrit­
ten.
(ti(m ) -  Pt{m)) = (i,(m ) - p , + 1 (m)) , i < l
- (« i(m )-p ,(m )) =  Pi(m)
Expressing the in terms of the strategic variables we find
*‘(m ) =  #Af< -  # A fi+1 ~ # M + iP .+ .(m ))
t,(m ) =  Pi(m)
Given the choice of market participants the market shares of the inter­
mediaries can be determined. On island m intermediary i expects a share of 
Qi (m ) =  l  — i^ (m) and q{ (m) =  t,-_ i (m) — (m) for i >  2 . His expected revenue
on that island is Ri(m) = qi (m)Pi (m).
The next result establishes the existence of an equilibrium in prices for any 
given constellation of information networks and subsidiaries. Each constellation 
defines an industrial structure (Mi)i€IN .
Result 2
For each industrial structure , Aft C { 1  there is a Nash
equilibrium in prices.
Proof:
1) While the network of islands determines the trading probability for each in­
termediary price competition remains localized on each island. Intermediaries’ 
total revenues are additive in the local revenues Ri =  Ri(m).  There are
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no spill overs of prices across islands. On each island each intermediary competes 
for potential buyers in a different competitive environment. Once he has been 
successful in attracting a buyer his payoff depends on whether he can find the 
seller on one of the islands included in his communication network. Hence, the 
analysis can be reduced to price competition for buyers on each single island. If 
the existence of price equilibrium is established for an arbitrary island it carries 
over to the whole network.
2 ) As already remarked earlier on each island only finitely many intermediaries 
can be active. We rank intermediaries on island m  in decreasing size of their 
network. After relabelling we get > # M 2 > ... > > 1
According to result 1 for it follows that Pj{m) =  0  , V/ > i.
Therefore, without loss of generality the analysis can be reduced to the case of 
# M l > # M 2 > ... > #Af, >  1
3) In this situation we can follow Shaked and Sutton (1983, pp .1475-76) to es­
tablish existence of a price equilibrium.
Observe tha t ti (m) formally are globally linear functions of the prices p, (m) 
and pi+ 1 (ra). Hence the revenue function 72, (m) is a quadratic function for the 
range of prices p,(m) in which — ^(m ) > 0 .
Now fix all prices P / ( m )  , j  ^  i. We plan to demonstrate tha t R i(m ) is a 
single peaked function of p{ (m) and hence quasi-concave.
While it is clear that for large Pi(m ) the critical buyer t,(m ) <  0 , inter­
mediary i earns zero revenues. By lowering the price he can generate a positive 
volume of trade and positive revenues, provided
Pi (m ) <   Pi~ 1 (m ) +#M«
i .
f t + i H
By lowering p,(m) further it will ultimately happen tha t intermediary i
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pushes intermediary t +  1 out of the market. This occurs for U = ti+l or equiva­
lently for
, # M i+2 ,
At slightly lower prices than p, (m) intermediary t ’s lower neighbour is i + 1 . 
As this process of reducing prices continues successively i will drive all his smaller 
competitors out of business.
We shall concentrate however on the shape of the revenue function R{ (m) 
at the critical price pi(m). For slightly lower prices it coincides with the function 
Ri (m) defined by
Ri(m) =  (t,_ i(m ) — ti+1 (m)) P{(m)
Since t,-_ x (m) and ti+1 (m) are linear in pt (m) the function Ri (m) is globally 
defined and a single peaked quadratic. Of course, only a segment Ri (m) will be 
part of Ri(m) for prices slightly lower than pi(m). We shall establish tha t the 
derivative of Ri (m) a t the point of intersection p, (m) is larger than the derivative 
of Ri (m). Since this property holds for any further ‘kink point’ of iZ, (m) it implies 
tha t Ri(m) is a single peaked function. To show this final claim evaluate the 
derivatives
_ „ # M i # M i
DPiRi =  2ti_ 1 -  2ti -  ——--------------------i n j 2Pi ~ -JJT7 ITU— 2Pi#M<_ i -  #Mi #M i -  # M i+!
D,“ R' = 2ti~l ~  2t<+1 “  # M j^ 1 - # M 2Pi
Given p, (m) is defined by the condition t{ = t i+1 the claim follows immedi­
ately.
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DPiR% |p. > DPiRi \pi
Now the process of price reductions can be continued until intermediary i + 2  
is driven out of business. At his critical price another kink point with the same 
property as pi (m) arises. Continuing this procedure Ri (m) is shown to be single 
peaked.
4) Therefore, the revenue functions Ri (m) are quasi-concave functions of pi (m ) . 
Moreover they are bounded. The strategy set for each intermediary is the convex 
interval [0 , 1 ] and hence a compact set. This allows to apply a standard fixed 
point argument to demonstrate the existence of equilibrium 11 .
Q.E.D.
11 see Friedman, 1977, pp .152-154,for example
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5. Industrial Structure
Based on their expectations about the ensuing price games intermediaries 
decide about their network investment. Since it is costly to establish a communi­
cation and information network, only investments will be undertaken which allow 
to recoup the outlays. Given positive fixed costs only a finite number of competi­
tors may be active in a market of finite size. However, the number of competitors 
may increase as market size increases relative to fixed costs and in the limit in 
large markets competitive equilibria may emerge. While this intuition is borne 
out in the Cournot model of imperfect competition it is not true in general in 
models of price competition with vertically differentiated products 12 . Likewise 
in our model the number of competitors is limited as the market grows in size. In 
fact, the equilibrium number of active intermediaries is limited as we shall see.
At a given market size A  and given fixed costs k per communication technolo­
gy and per island only a limited number of intermediaries will enter the industry 
at the investment stage 0 . As long as the market is relatively small multiple 
industrial structures may be compatible with equilibrium. For example suppose 
tha t each island may support only a single intermediary in the sense tha t the 
monopolistic rents on a particular island barely exceed the fixed expenses and 
assume further that only independent non-overlapping networks of monopolistic 
intermediaries would be profitable. In this situation a global monopoly as well as 
two independent monopolists, i and j ,  with networks of similar or identical size, 
could be equilibrium industrial structures. But also in larger 
markets which allow several competitors to earn positive revenues in general no 
unique industrial structure can be expected as long as the markets are not too 
large relative to costs.
Multiple industrial structures are possible in small markets because the in­
centives to expand a given network are weakened by the force of price competi­
tion. The transaction volume achievable at low margins in a competitive environ­
12 see for example Shaked, Sutton, 1982
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ment on a given island may not compensate for the costs of entry into the island 
concerned. As the market grows, however, the role of costs is reduced. The larger 
transaction volume may generate the revenue necessary to render entry into a 
particular island profitable. The monopolistic structures of the preceding exam­
ple do not obtain in large markets. A global monopoly will always be challenged 
by small intermediaries, who need to acquire small market shares only to justify 
entry. Hence, in large markets the industrial structure is truly oligopolistic.
The next result presents an industrial structure which is the unique equilib­
rium structure for any large enough A  relative to k. We shall view this constel­
lation as the natural industrial structure.
In case of a single island, as in chapter two, the natural industrial structure 
obviously is a monopoly with a single intermediary investing in the communica­
tion technology. But also for any number of islands in such a natural industrial 
structure the largest intermediary maintains his presence on all islands. However, 
with several islands there is room for profitable entry of further intermediaries. 
By choosing smaller networks they can differentiate themselves from their larger 
competitors and thus relax price competition. So they can generate positive rev­
enues which cover their fixed outlays in large enough markets.
In the natural industrial structure of our brokerage market, as we shall see, 
there are exactly two intermediaries quoting prices on M  — 1 islands if Af > 4. 
They choose different networks leaving a joint of their networks consisting of M  — 
2 islands. For convenience we label those islands {2 , ...,M  — 1 }. On these islands 
competition among the two intermediaries is quite intense. It drives margins 
down to zero since both intermediaries offer the same trading probabilities of
. Only on the remaining “niche islands” , 1 and M , price competition is 
relaxed leaving space for further entrants.
Let us now state the result.
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Result 3
a) As k  —► 0 and/or A  —» oo, a unique 13 industrial structure emerges : 
M  = 1 : AT, =  {1}
M, = 0 , j > 2 
M  =  2 : Mi =  {1 ,2}
M2 = { 1 }
M3 = {2}
M, =  0 , y >  4 
M  =  3 : Mj = { 1 ,2 , 3 }
M2 = { 1 , 2 }
M, =  {2,3}
= {1}
M6 =  {3}
Mi =  0  , i  > 6
M  >  4 : Mi =  {1, . . . ,M}
M2 = { 1 , . . . , M - 1 }
M * = { 2 , . . . ,M }
M, =  { 1 , . . . , M - /  +  1,M} , 4 < 1 < M
M m + i =  {l}
M m + 2 = { M }
A f y = 0  , j > M  +  3
13 unique up to labels
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b) Equilibria are characterized by
M =  1
M  = 2
Af =  3
M  > 4
: P i ( m )> P i (m )  , mG { 1, 2} , i =  2,3
P2(l) =  P3(2) > 0
P i ( l )  =  R l (2) >  P 2 ( l )  =  P 3 (2) >  0
: P1( m ) > P i (m) , mG { 1 , 2 , 3 }  , i =  2 , 3 , 4 , 5
P 2 (2) =  P3 (2) = 0  
P a ( l )  =  P s (3) > P 4 (1) =  P6 (3) > 0
Pi (l) =  Pi (3) > P 2 (l) =  P 3 (3) > P 4 — P 5 > 0 
Pi (2) > P 2 (2) =  P 3 (2) =  0
: Pi (m) > Pi (m) , m  G Mx nMj , » > 2
P2 (m) =  P3 (m) =  0 , m  G {2, . . . ,M — 1}
P2(1) =  P3(M) >P, . (M) , MG{1,M> , j > 4
P*(m) > Pg(m) > ••• > Pm + i(1) =  Pm + 2 (M) > 0
P» (^1) >  Py (”*) > m  G M,’ (1 My > J >  *
Pi (m) > P 2 (m) =  P 3 (ro) =  0 , m G {2, . . . ,M — 1} 
Pi > P 2 =  P 3 > P 4 >  ... >  Pm +1 — Pm+2 ^ 0
140
Furthermore in the case M  > 4 the expected transaction volume generated on 
islands {2 — 1} is positive for intermediaries 1,2 and 3 only. However, all 
active intermediaries attract positive market shares on the two niche islands 1 
and M.
For m  G {2,..., Af — 1}
Qi (m)
for m  G { l,M }
&(m) > 0
Proof:
1) In the case M  — 1 no possibility of differentiation exists for intermediaries. 
Hence, monopoly is the unique and natural industrial structure. The charac­
terization of equilibrium follows immediately from t x =  pi , Pi = 2 px and 
Pi =argm axp( i  -  p)2p =  J .
2 ) In the remaining cases as the economy grows the largest intermediary has an 
incentive to include all islands in his network. Since he is the largest firm in each 
island according to result 1 he generates the largest revenues. In particular, these 
revenues are positive and allow to recover any fixed costs as those decline relative 
to the size of the market. Therefore, a natural industrial structure has exactly 
one omnipresent intermediary.
3) The only chance for further intermediaries to engage in profitable trading is 
by differentiating themselves from the largest intermediary and hence setting up
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smaller networks. How many islands will the second largest intermediary include 
in his network? Obviously, he needs to include Af — 1 islands. If he selected less 
islands a rival could choose the same network and add one island. So the rival 
would be larger and could enjoy a higher probability of trade. According to result 
1 he would earn larger revenues on each island in the subsequent price game. As 
^  is sufficiently large such a strategy would be profitable. Therefore, the second 
largest intermediary has to be active on Af — 1 islands in large markets.
4) Now there is scope for two intermediaries to engage in profitable trade on 
M  — 1 islands. If they choose the same network, of course, both will earn zero 
revenue in total. However, they can operate different networks. In this case the 
networks overlap on Af — 2  islands {2 ,...,A f — l}. Since there they offer the 
same probability of trade, in equilibrium they cannot command any positive 
margin and equilibrium prices are zero. However, on the niche islands 1 and Af 
only one of them  is present. Therefore, on the niche islands price competition is 
imperfect and allows them to earn positive revenues, which allow to recover the 
fixed expenses for the whole network as fc is sufficiently small relative to A.
In order to validate this statement we have to establish th a t in equilibrium 
& (i)  > 0  and likewise p2 (Af) > 0 . According to result 2  we are ascertained the 
existence of an equilibrium. If the claim were wrong at least for one of the niche 
islands the equilibrium price of intermediary 2  has to equal zero. So assume 
p2 (l) =  0 , which according to result 1 implies p, (l) = 0  , i > 2 . We shall
demonstrate tha t this is inconsistent with equilibrium.
If under the maintained assumption t x > 0  because of the continuity of the 
function defining the critical agent t x with respect to p2 there is a profitable 
deviation p2 (1 ) =  e, which yields R 2( 1 ) > 0  for small enough e. This estab­
lishes the contradiction. On the other side =  0 , by definition of £l 5 implies 
M rrl f - D  (AfPi(l) -  (Af -  l)p 2 (l)) =  0 . Therefore, pA(l) =  0  and £ A(1) =  0 . 
Now the same type of deviation is profitable for intermediary 1, i.e. px (1 ) =  e 
yields (1 ) >  0  if e is small enough contradicting equilibrium.
So by establishing p2 (1) > 0  we have demonstrated the profitability of the
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niche markets for intermediary 2  and 3. Observe that the same argument now 
can be applied for any further entrant of smaller size. Since none of them will 
quote zero prices in equilibrium there is always space for another intermediary 
with smaller trading probabilities.
5) In fact, in a natural industrial structure exactly two intermediaries possess 
networks of size M  — 1 . This follows from the fact tha t only finitely many inter­
mediaries can earn positive revenues. Any further potential intermediary prefers 
to remain inactive.
Suppose intermediary 1 operates M L and only intermediary 2 chooses a net­
work of size M  — 1 . Any further intermediary selects a smaller network with 
correspondingly smaller trading probabilities. In this case one of the inactive in­
termediaries could choose network Af3 and gain the same probability of trade as 
intermediary 2 . In this case the “inactive” intermediary would earn positive rev­
enue on island Af. When the market is large enough this contradicts equilibrium. 
Therefore, in large markets exactly two intermediaries will operate networks of 
the size Af — 1.
6 ) If Af >  4 the niche islands 1 and Af provide space for further intermedi­
aries operating in both niche islands. On these islands they can generate positive 
revenues by demanding positive equilibrium prices as argued in step 4.
They cannot profitably quote prices on the remaining islands {2 , . . . ,Af — 1 }. 
Nevertheless, they can maintain a presence on these islands in order to search for 
buyers. In fact, they have an incentive to establish a large network for search in 
order to increase their attraction for sellers on the niche islands and thus boost 
revenues. Accordingly, they will purchase access to the communication system 
not only on the niche islands but also on islands where they cannot originate 
any trade. In order to differentiate themselves from their competitors they have 
to select networks of different size. Provided all of them offer different trading 
probabilities, all of them  can earn possibly “small” but positive revenues in trade 
generated on the niche islands.
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Because the number of islands limits the possibilities of differentiation, for 
M  > 4  there are exactly M  — 3 intermediaries generating positive trading volume 
on the two niche islands only. Finally, in equilibrium there is still space for two 
further intermediaries of size 1 concentrating exclusively on trade on one of the 
niche islands.
7) The industrial structures in the cases 2  < M  < 3 are readily verified as 
equilibrium structures by direct application of result 1 .
8 ) Finally, in equilibrium only the networks of intermediaries 2 and 3 do over­
lap, where both  intermediaries earn zero revenues on the overlapping islands. 
Therefore, the characterization of equilibrium follows immediately from result 1.
Q.E.D.
Accordingly, in a natural industrial structure exactly M  +  2  intermediaries 
are active. However, most of them are rather small generating positive transaction 
volumes only on the two niche islands 1 and M. Exactly three intermediaries, 1 , 2  
and 3, generate positive transaction volumes on at least Af — 1 islands. They also 
enjoy the largest market shares. Jointly they share more than M~- of the market 
while the remaining “niche players” attract a market share of less than ~ .
In this sense the natural industrial structure is fairly concentrated with three 
large intermediaries and a competitive fringe of niche players. Also no convergence 
to a fragmented structure obtains on islands {2 , . . . ,M  — 1 }. Rather, as M grows 
the relative importance of the smaller intermediaries diminishes while the degree 
of differentiation, as measured by the difference in trading probabilities, among 
the three large intermediaries vanishes. As they become increasingly similar price 
competition among the “big three” tightens and equilibrium prices converge to 
Walrasian prices.
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R e su lt 4
Equilibrium prices for the industrial structure described in result 3 converge to 
Walrasian prices as the number of islands increases. I.e. P»(m) —► 0 , m  G Mt 
and Ri —► 0  , Vi as M  —> oo.
Proof:
Given the industrial structure of result 3 on each island intermediary 1 has 
a lower neighbour with trading probability of M~ 1. As M  increase this proba­
bility tends to 1 and competitions tightens. To see this we write intermediary l ’s 
revenue function:
R t(m )  =  ( l  — ti (m)) Pi (m)
where
H  =  M - ( M -  1) (M Pl ^  ~ ( M ~  1)Pi M )  ’ * e  t 2’
The first order condition for profit maximization on island m G {l,...,A f}  
yields
1 — (m) — MPi  (m) =  0
Accordingly
Pi M  =  1  - * 0  ( M  -» oo)
Since Pi (m) > P< (m) for m 6  Mi  we have established limM — oo P* (m) =  0 .
Q.E.D.
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Accordingly, the convergence of prices does not result from increased entry 
of intermediaries in the niche markets but from increased competition among the 
big intermediaries.
In summary, the number of active intermediaries in large markets, as mea­
sured by A , is bounded. While this bound in general depends on M  the number 
of “large” intermediaries is three for any M  > 2 . Equilibrium payoffs decisively 
depend on the number of islands. As their number increases the degree of differen­
tiation among the large intermediaries is reduced. Price competition strengthens. 
It is worth noting tha t albeit the strong incentive to monopolization of the in­
formation generating activities, as evident in the case M  = 1 , there is enough 
scope for effective competition if M  >  2 . The possibility of creating niche markets 
allows competitors to generate the revenue necessary for recovering their fixed 
expenses. Thus, Bertrand price competition on heterogenous markets yields dis­
tinctly different outcomes as compared to price competition on a homogenous 
market.
The model predicts tha t larger intermediaries can earn extra margins for the 
better quality of their products or services. Indeed this seems to correspond to 
observed behaviour in the West German and Swiss banking market. A common 
explanation given by bankers of the larger institutions often is the superior quality 
of their products. Our model validates such an explanation at most for brokerage 
services. However, care has to be taken since both in Switzerland and in West 
Germany universal banking is common and banks’ pricing policies traditionally 
are based on mixed accounting (Krummel, 1964). In such an industry it is difficult 
to analyze single product lines in isolation. Nevertheless, it is evident th a t the 
three largest banks in both countries also dispose of the most wide spread network 
of international subsidiaries and affiliations. This gives them a competitive edge 
in the business of trade finance for example.
Interestingly, the competitiveness of our brokerage industry cannot be judged 
by concentration ratios or by counting the number of competitors alone. In fact 
these measures may be misleading. As M  increases both the concentration ratio 
C R 3, defined as the market share of the three largest firms relative to the whole
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market, and the number of active firms rises, while equilibrium spreads converge 
to their competitive level. Rather the existence and the profitability of niche 
markets is decisive in determining the degree of competitiveness in the industry.
The empirical question concerning the “number of islands” and the possibil­
ity of creating niche markets is likely to be a difficult one. According to our model, 
for example, where islands essentially are defined by a lack of communication and 
information links between subgroups of potential traders, the task of counting 
islands would amount to analyze the micro structure of the communication and 
information system between the potential market participants.
Finally, we conclude this section with a remark on the convergence process. 
Obviously, in our model the market can grow in at least two different ways. 
Either the scale parameter A  may increase or the number of islands M  or even a 
combination of the two. In our analysis implicitly we looked at processes where 
A  grows sufficiently fast relative to M.  This procedure is justified in markets in 
which the number of independent and separated islands does not increase rapidly 
while market volume increases steadily.
International stock markets provide an example of markets in which trans­
action volumes have been rising significantly over years and where innovations in 
communication and information technologies have reduced the informational dif­
ferences across national stock exchanges. In the metaphor of our model we could 
describe this process of communicational integration of the stock exchanges by 
a reduction of islands. For this case the model predicts increasing margins once 
the natural industrial structure is reached. The degree of concentration remains 
unaffected but as the number of islands is reduced niche markets become more 
relevant for differentiating the competitors and price competition is relaxed. In 
this sense advances in communication technologies may reduce the competitive­
ness of the brokerage markets. In the limit the natural monopoly of the previous 
chapter obtains.
While this prediction may seem quite strong and practitioners may claim 
th a t advances in information technologies have increased the possibilities of cre­
ating niche markets, we hasten to add tha t the market under consideration is a
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market for a  single product or security, such as an ordinary IBM-share certifi­
cate. We do not address ourselves to the interesting questions of multiproduct 
competition and financial innovation.
6. Relations to the Literature
There is an im portant difference between our model of network competition 
and Shaked and Sutton’s (1982) model of vertical product differentiation. In our 
model the ‘qualities’ of the top firms are ‘very close’ as M  —► oo and equilibrium 
prices converge to marginal costs. No result of this kind occurs in Shaked, Sutton, 
though it should be made clear tha t a precise analogy between the models is not 
possible, as there is no analog in Shaked, Sutton to our ‘number of islands’ Af.
T hat said it is still of interest to ask why the present convergence result holds. 
We start by providing a short account of Shaked and Sutton’s basic model (1982). 
They analyze competition in a market with vertically differentiated products as 
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three stage game. In the first stage 
firms decide about entry. Entry is costly. In the second stage they select a product 
quality u from an intervall of technologically available qualities [u, u]. Finally at 
stage three competition in prices takes place.
As im portant differences Shaked and Sutton use a continuum of qualities 
and the gameform of a three stage game. If u is to be chosen from a discrete set 
{ux, ...,u n} such th a t u x >  ... > un their results are not seriously impaired. This 
is readily seen, since their proof of existence of a Nash equilibrium in qualities 
only requires u to be selected from a compact set and does not depend on the 
fact th a t u is drawn from a continuum (1982, pp.9,10).
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Now an im portant difference between Shaked, Sutton and the present model 
lies in our use of a two stage game. The three stage game allows competitors 
to react to changes in the number of entrants in their choice of quality. In the 
two stage game used here a potential entrant cannot take as given the quality 
of incumbents. This has the effect of forcing the ‘second highest’ quality higher, 
since if this quality is ‘far below’ the top quality, then any such configuration can 
be ‘broken’ by the entry of a new firm offering a higher quality. It is this feature 
which in our model leads the second largest intermediary to select a network of 
size M  — 1. Hence, we get ‘convergence in qualities’ as M  —► oo.
Moreover, in contrast to Shaked and Sutton (1982), the model of network 
competition exhibits an industrial structure with very large and very small firms. 
In general there are no moderately sized intermediaries. This effect is a partic­
ularity of the network model, which allows small intermediaries to enter niches 
left by large intermediaries in their attem pt to differentiate themselves from their 
large rivals. For real world comparisons we should bear in mind the restriction 
of the analysis to a single product market. Most real world intermediaries offer 
a variety of products and services.
149
7. C onclusion
We have analyzed a brokerage market in which intermediaries can affect 
their trading probabilities by establishing an information and communication 
network. As communication possibilities across potential traders are imperfect we 
found that in general several firms will offer intermediary services. Nevertheless, 
the industrial structure turns out to be fairly concentrated with few large firms 
competing across most submarkets.
However, we also find th a t the concentration ratio may not be a good guide 
for measuring the degree of competitiveness of the industry. Since the few active 
firms turn out to be of roughly similar size price competition is fairly intense and 
quite competitive allocations result.
Although we have not explicitly modelled the possibility of private search 
following the lead of chapter two it can be easily accommodated in the present 
framework. In this case both the phenomena of chapters two and three will arise. 
Intermediaries compete against the search market in addition and only those who 
can increase trading probabilities sufficiently will be able to earn positive margins. 
In equilibrium high valuation traders prefer trade with large intermediaries, while 
only the lowest valuation traders may have to resort to private search 14 . Multiple 
equilibria derive from the inability of market participants to coordinate market 
participation. The industrial structure in any of these equilibria, however, is at 
least as concentrated as in the present analysis.
14 In the equilibrium of result 3 only on the niche islands 1 and M  some market 
participants with valuations r < pM + 2 prefer direct search.
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